officers for the commission of such serious life‑endangering crimes than they are with ordinary offenders, because what is at stake is not only the issue of the individual criminal-law liability of the perpetrators but also the State’s duty to combat the sense of impunity the offenders may consider they enjoy by virtue of their very office and to maintain public confidence in and respect for the law-enforcement system (see, mutatis mutandis, Nikolova and Velichkova, cited above, § 63). In this regard, the Court considers that, as a matter of principle, it would be wholly inappropriate and would send a wrong signal to the public if the perpetrators of the very serious crime in question maintained eligibility for holding public office in the future (see Türkmen v. Turkey, no. 43124/98, § 53, 19 December 2006, and Abdülsamet Yaman, cited above, § 55).”211 211. Enukidze and Girgvliani v. Georgia, Judgment of 26 April 2011, application no. 25091/07, para. 274 Explanatory note ► Page 71