danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country; additional grounds must exist to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Similarly, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights does not mean that a person cannot be considered to be in danger of being subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 7.3 In the present case, the Committee notes the State party’s argument that it is beyond its competence to review findings of fact or the interpretation of domestic legislation by national organs of the State party. The Committee agrees that it cannot overturn an authoritative domestic organ’s interpretation of the application of domestic legislation, but reiterates that it is not bound by findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party and instead has the power, provided for by article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case.1 The Committee recalls that, even though there may be some remaining doubt as to the veracity of the facts adduced by a complainant, it must ensure that his security is not endangered.2 In order to do this, it is not necessary that all the facts invoked by the complainant should be proved; it is sufficient that the Committee should consider them to be sufficiently substantiated and reliable. 7.4 With regard to the complainant’s claim that he was in danger of being subjected to torture by the LTTE, the Committee recalls that the State party’s obligation to refrain from forcibly returning a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture is directly linked to the definition of torture as found in article 1 of the Convention. For the purposes of the Convention, according to article 1, “the term ‘torture’ means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”. The Committee recalls its previous jurisprudence that the issue whether the State party has an obligation to refrain from expelling a person who might risk pain or suffering inflicted by a non-governmental entity, without the consent or acquiescence of the Government, falls outside the scope of article 3 of the Convention.3 7.5 The Committee notes with concern the reports of torture by public officials in Sri Lanka, including those submitted by the complainant, but points out that, for the purposes of article 3 of the Convention, substantial grounds must exist that create a foreseeable, real and personal risk of torture in the country to which the complainant is to be returned. On the basis of the facts as submitted by the complainant, the Committee is of the opinion that such grounds have not been established. Therefore, the Committee considers that the complainant has not substantiated his claim that he was personally at a real risk of being subjected to torture, if returned to Sri Lanka. 8. The Committee against Torture, acting under article 22, paragraph 7, of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, concludes that the removal of the complainant to Sri Lanka, on the basis 7