the trials of 15 men in connection with an incident in the town of Andijan, Uzbekistan, in May 2005 in which civilians and military personnel were killed during a mass gathering. Another special-purpose trial-monitoring project was implemented jointly by ODIHR and the OSCE Office in Baku to monitor the trials of groups of demonstrators accused of participating in election-related violence in Azerbaijan. In both projects, trials were monitored to assess the compliance of proceedings with domestic law and international fair-trial standards where the use of force and coercion in pre-trial stages was of particular concern. As the atmosphere around such trials is often highly politicized, the primary purpose of such programmes in the past was to provide a measure of international oversight of the trials regarding compliance with fair-trial standards. In turn, these programmes have sought to engage more directly in political advocacy, including making recommendations calling for reconsideration of verdicts, as well as other government action to remedy the identified underlying human rights violations. By their nature, these projects are also usually of more limited scope, focusing primarily on cases related to the human rights incident that served as the catalyst for monitoring, and their duration depends on the cases being monitored. Therefore, while monitoring may reveal issues that may relate to the need for wider judicial reform, both the politicized nature of the trials and narrow subject matter of monitoring make comprehensive analysis of systemic problems with the judicial system difficult. Special-purpose projects with such a focus and scope are therefore not particularly well suited to contribute to a more comprehensive approach to judicial reform. These programmes best serve to provide a measure of oversight and human rights protection through the exercise of the fundamental right to a public trial, as well as through the transparency and political pressure created by the expression of this right. Given the short time frame for deployment, such programmes often face special challenges in quickly organizing a team, including: becoming well versed on domestic events and legal procedures, hiring monitors, and developing a methodology and strategies that take into account the increased political attention and heightened barriers to accessing case information that may exist in these contexts. Special-purpose projects should also consider using international monitors where political issues or heightened security risks accompany the trials that are the subject of monitoring (see Chapter 4.4, “Staffing monitors”) 3.5 Domestic monitoring organizations or coalitions An alternative to organizing a trial-monitoring programme under one of the above institutional models is for an international organization to provide support for an independent domestic monitoring organization, or, alternatively, a trial-monitoring coalition. Unlike an internationally run trial-monitoring operation, a domestic monitoring organization may operate as a local NGO or coalition of NGOs under domestic law, and is comprised entirely of national citizens. As such, domestic law governs both the legal status and organizational requirements of domestic groups. Relevant local law should therefore be reviewed to determine the need to register an organization. Trial-Monitoring: A Reference Manual for Practitioners 41