CAT/C/61/D/659/2015 8.2 The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the complaint should be declared inadmissible under article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, as the complainant and his family have not exhausted all available domestic remedies. First, they have not applied to the Federal Court for leave to seek a judicial review of the decisions of 30 October 2015 rejecting their pre-removal risk assessment and permanent residence applications; second, they have not sought leave for a judicial review of the decision of the Canada Border Services Agency of 28 January 2015 rejecting their application for administrative deferral of their removal; and third, in November 2016, the complainant, on his own and on behalf of his wife and daughter, submitted a new application for permanent residence on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. The Committee also notes the State party’s contention that the judicial review in the Federal Court provides for an effective remedy against removal. 8.3 In this context, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence according to which such judicial review deals mainly with procedural issues and does not involve a review of the merits of the case. 23 As the complainant had already submitted applications to the Immigration and Refugee Board and the Federal Court, as well as applications under the procedures for pre-removal risk assessment and permanent residence on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, the Committee considers that it would be unreasonable to require that the complainant also apply for a judicial review of the negative risk assessment decision. Regarding the new application for permanent residence, submitted in November 2016, the Committee recalls that an application for permanent residence does not constitute, in any case, an effective remedy for the purposes of admissibility, given its non-legal nature and the fact that it does not stay the removal of a complainant. 24 Accordingly, the Committee considers that it is not precluded by the requirements of article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention from considering the communication. 8.4 The Committee recalls that for a claim to be admissible under article 22 of the Convention and rule 113 (b) of its rules of procedure, it must attain the basic level of substantiation required for purposes of admissibility. The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the communication is manifestly ill-founded owing to a lack of substantiation. The Committee considers, however, that the arguments put forward by the complainant raise substantive issues under article 3 of the Convention and that the merits of those arguments should be addressed. Accordingly, the Committee declares the communication admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 9.1 In accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, the Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties. 9.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the removal of the complainant and his family to Sri Lanka would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (refouler) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 23 24 See communication No. 582/2014, N.S. v. Canada, decision adopted on 1 December 2016, para. 8.2. See, inter alia, Kalonzo v. Canada, para. 8.3. 11