the refugee was in a regular position, he must not be turned back to a country where his life or freedom could be threatened.” 64 31. The same representative of the United States proposed that the words “undertakes not to expel or return (refouler)” should replace the words “not turn back” in order to settle any doubts that non-refoulement applied to refugees whether or not they had been regularly admitted to residence, 65 an amendment that ultimately formed the basis for the “expel or return” final wording of Article 33 of the 1951 Convention. It is also worth noting that at one point the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee suspended the discussion, observing that it had indicated agreement on the principle that refugees fleeing from persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality or political opinion should not be pushed back into the arms of their persecutors. 66 B. Extraterritorial Applicability of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention: Subsequent State Practice and Relevant Rules of International Law 32. Limiting the territorial scope of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention to conduct of a State within its national territory would also be at variance with subsequent State practice and relevant rules of international law applicable between the States party to the treaty in question. In accordance with Article 31(3) of the 1969 Vienna Convention, 67 these elements also need to be taken into account in interpreting a provision of an international treaty. 33. Subsequent State practice is expressed, inter alia, through numerous Executive Committee Conclusions which attest to the overriding importance of the principle of non-refoulement irrespective of whether the refugee is in the national territory of the State concerned. 68 Subsequent State practice which is relevant to the interpretation of the non-refoulement obligation under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol is also evidenced by other international refugee and human rights instruments drawn up since 1951, none of which places territorial restrictions on States’ non-refoulement obligations. 69 64 65 66 67 68 69 Statement of Mr. Henkin of the United States, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.20, Feb 1, 1950, paras. 54–55. U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.20, para. 56. Statement of the Chairman, Mr. Chance of Canada, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32.SR.21, 2 February 1950, at page 7. The Chairman then invited the representatives of Belgium and the United States to confer with him to attempt the preparation of a suitable draft for later consideration. Supra footnote 53. See, for example, Executive Committee, Conclusion No. 6 (XXVIII), supra footnote 9, at para (c) (reaffirming “the fundamental importance of the observance of the principle of non-refoulement – both at the border and within the territory of a State …”); Conclusion No. 15 (XXX) “Refugees without an Asylum Country” (1979) paras. (b) and (c) (stating that “[a]ction whereby a refugee is obliged to return or is sent to a country where he has reason to fear persecution constitutes a grave violation of the principle of non-refoulement” and noting that “[i]t is the humanitarian obligation of all coastal States to allow vessels in distress to seek haven in their waters and to grant asylum, or at least temporary refuge, to persons on board wishing to seek asylum.”); Conclusion No. 22 (XXXII) “Protection of Asylum-Seekers in Situations of Large-Scale Influx” (1981), at II.A.2. (“In all cases the fundamental principle of non-refoulement – including non-rejection at the frontier – must be scrupulously observed.”); Conclusion No. 53 (XXXIX) “Stowaway Asylum-Seekers” (1988), para. (1) (providing inter alia that “[l]ike other asylum seekers, stowaway asylum-seekers must be protected against forcible return to their country of origin.”). These include, in particular, the 1969 OAU Convention (supra footnote 22); the 1969 ACHR (supra footnote 23); and the Convention Against Torture (supra footnote 39). See also the expressions of the principle of non-refoulement in non-binding texts such as, for example, the 1984 Cartagena 15