CCPR/C/118/D/2299/2013 available to them. Under the Asylum Seekers and Other Categories of Aliens (Provision) Order, they are entitled to reception facilities and can obtain a weekly financial allowance and other financial provisions. In addition to these arrangements, the State party has a system for the reception and housing of current and former asylum seekers that ensures that no migrant is forced to live on the street. The same applies to those who have not submitted an application for asylum, since the Asylum Seekers and Other Categories of Aliens (Provision) Order of 2005 views several categories of aliens as asylum seekers, thereby rendering them eligible for shelter and benefits. Once the statutory departure period has expired, aliens can stay in restrictive accommodation, where they receive assistance in arranging for their departure. The option of staying in restrictive accommodation is available to persons who have not sought asylum, as in the author’s case, provided that they are willing to cooperate in returning to their country of origin. In general, people residing in restrictive accommodation are free to move only within the municipality in which the facility is located. 8.9 The State party maintains that the author has failed to exhaust all available domestic remedies for obtaining a residence permit since he did not lodge an appeal with the Council of State against the judgments of the Hague District Court upholding the decisions denying his application for a residence permit. In that connection, it points out that in its legal system the right to social assistance is linked to lawful residence. The State party adds that the author did not exhaust all available domestic remedies in the proceedings regarding access to shelter since he did not lodge an appeal against the judgments of the Hague District Court of 18 July 2014 (see para. 6.2) and 11 June 2015 (see para. 8.5). Moreover, the author did not avail himself of the State Secretary’s offer of shelter for the duration of the residence procedures. 8.10 The author’s claims regarding the denial of his application for shelter and/or social assistance are in essence an invocation of social rights and based on provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Although a violation of social rights may in certain cases be regarded as a violation of the Covenant, if in principle obligations under the Covenant have been fulfilled, an invocation of a social right cannot then lead to a finding of a breach of the Covenant. In the author’s case, he has been provided with basic needs and, therefore, his claims fall outside the scope of the Covenant. Accordingly, the communication should be declared inadmissible ratione materiae. 8.11 Should the Committee find the communication admissible, the State party maintains that it does not disclose a violation of the author’s rights under articles 7, 17 and 26 of the Covenant. Articles 7 and 17 of the Covenant do not give rise to a right to shelter or to social assistance for persons who are not lawfully resident in the States parties. The Covenant does not impose a requirement on a State party to offer every person in an irregular residence situation access to social services. 4 8.12 In the present case, the situation of the author does not entail a treatment contrary to article 7 of the Covenant. Likewise, the authorities’ refusal to grant the author supplementary support does not constitute arbitrary interference in his right to privacy, which is protected by article 17 of the Covenant. Such a measure was justified in view of the balance that has to be struck between the interests of the author in having shelter and social assistance and the interests of the State party in ensuring that shelter and social assistance remain affordable and accessible and in ensuring an effective immigration policy. 4 8 The State party refers to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in its judgments in the following cases: N. v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 May 2008, application No. 26565/05, para. 44; Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, judgment of 21 June 2011, application No. 5335/05, para. 54; and Chapman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 2011, application No. 27238/95, paras. 99101.