CAT/C/63/D/767/2016 reasonableness standard, are consistent with the approach of the European Court of Human Rights, whereby judicial review using this standard satisfied the requirement to provide an effective remedy.8 For these reasons, judicial review is a procedure that must be exhausted for the purposes of admissibility and the complainant has failed to provide any explanation as to why he failed to exhaust this remedy. 4.8 Should the Committee consider the communication admissible, the State party submits that it is wholly without merit. The complainant has not presented sufficient and credible evidence that he faces a foreseeable, real and personal risk of being subjected to torture by State officials or people acting in an official capacity, if returned to Pakistan. 4.9 The State party further submits that, according to the available evidence, State protection and a viable internal flight alternative may be available to him in Pakistan. Although the location of the alleged attack in April 2010 is unclear, the complainant appears to be claiming the risk, if any, would be from Lashkar-e-Taiba in and around his home town of Lahore. 4.10 The State party requests the Committee to lift the interim measures in respect of the complainant as he failed to establish that he would face irreparable harm if returned to Pakistan. His communication is incompatible with the Convention as the acts that were allegedly perpetrated against him in the past and would be perpetrated in the future were not carried out by State officials and thus do not constitute “torture” within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention. Furthermore, the State party’s authorities have determined that State protection and an internal flight alternative would be available to him in Pakistan, which would allow him to live without serious risk of harm. Complainant’s comments on the State party’s observations 5.1 Further to the Committee’s request to substantiate the risk the complainant faced upon his return to Pakistan, on 3 November 2016, his counsel submitted that there were no blasphemy charges against the complainant in Pakistan and that “the police was just harassing his family that they would falsely take action against him for blasphemy”. No further information in this connection was provided by the complainant, despite specific requests. 5.2 On 5 May 2017, the complainant commented on the State party’s observations, requesting that the interim measures be maintained and for the Committee to consider the communication on the merits. He submits that if returned to Pakistan he would face a serious risk of death and torture at the hands of Sunni terrorists and extremists (Lashkar-eTaiba), the police and his girlfriend’s family; a serious risk of arrest and detention under false charges, such as blasphemy; and a serious risk of abduction, murder, beheading or stoning to death by Lashkar-e-Taiba. The complainant claims that he was assaulted, and his cousin was killed, by Lashkar-e-Taiba and that his family have received threats from them. He explains that the Government supports Sunni terrorist organizations, such as Lashkar-eTaiba, and is involved in the killing and persecution of minorities. He did not receive any protection from the authorities in the past and no protection would be available to him in the future. The authorities are unwilling and unable to investigate or prosecute the perpetrators of attacks against religious minorities. 5.3 The complainant argues that there is no viable internal flight alternative for him in Pakistan as Sunni terrorists are spread all over the country and are looking for him. 8 FC 43 (CanLII), in which the Court found that the pre-removal risk assessment officer had failed to consider new psychological evidence; Bors v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1004 (CanLII), paras. 56−58 and 73, in which the Court determined that the pre-removal risk assessment officer’s selective review of the evidence had led to an unreasonable finding that the situation of the Roma people in Hungary had improved. See European Court of Human Rights, Soering v. The United Kingdom (application No. 14038/88), judgment of 7 July 1989; and Vilvarajah and others v. The United Kingdom (application Nos. 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87 and 13448/87), judgment of 30 October 1991. 5