CEDAW/C/68/D/91/2015 is of the view that, as long as the violence towards a former spouse or partner stems from that person being in a prior relationship with a perpetrator, as in the present case, the time that has elapsed since the end of the relationship is irrelevant, as is whether the persons concerned live together. The Committee also recalls that, pursuant to the Istanbul Convention, domestic violence is defined as “acts of physical, sexual, psychological or economic violence that o ccur within the family or domestic unit or between former or current spouses or partners, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the victim ” (art. 3 (b)). The Convention includes no statutory time limit on how long after the end of a relationship a spouse or partner can claim that the violence perpetrated by the ex-partner falls within the definition of “domestic” violence. The Committee therefore considers that K.’s actions towards the author fall within the definition of domestic violence. 7.5 The Committee also recalls that, under articles 2 (a), (c), (d) and (e) and 5 (a) of the Convention, the State party has a duty to modify or abolish not only existing laws and regulations, but also customs and practices that const itute discrimination against women. In that regard, the Committee stresses that stereotyping affects women’s rights to a fair trial and that the judiciary must be careful not to create inflexible standards on the basis of preconceived notions of what const itutes domestic or gender-based violence, as noted in its general recommendation No. 33 (2015) on women’s access to justice. 11 7.6 In the present case, the compliance of the State party with its obligations under articles 2 (a), (c), (d) and (e) and 5 (a) of the Convention to eliminate gender stereotypes needs to be assessed in the light of the level of gender sensitivity applied in the judicial handling of the author ’s case. In that regard, the Committee notes that it took the District Court 22 days, instead of the 3 prescribed by law, to rule on the author’s petition that she be provided with protective measures. The Committee also notes with concern that the author submitted official complaints to the police four times between February and August 2013 and that all her complaints resulted in refusals to initiate criminal proceedings, despite the direct order received from the District Prosecutor ’s Office and the District Court to interrogate K. and carry out all other necessary investigative procedures. No o ther measures were taken by the authorities to protect the author against the violence by her former partner and, more than three years after the events in question took place, the authorities had still not even interrogated K. When it eventually ruled on the petition, the Court referenced the refusal by the police to initiate criminal proceedings against K. and the absence of a “real threat” as a basis for refusing to provide protective measures, even though one month earlier the same court had found the same refusal to be unlawful and unsubstantiated. The Committee notes that none of these facts has been disputed by the State party and that, read as a whole, they indicate that, by failing to investigate the author ’s complaint about death threats and threats of violence promptly, adequately and effectively and by failing to address her case in a gender-sensitive manner, the authorities allowed their reasoning to be influenced by stereotypes. The Committee therefore concludes that the State party’s authorities failed to act in a timely and adequate manner and to protect the author from violence and intimidation, in violation of the obligations under the Convention. 7.7 The Committee further notes the author ’s submission that, to date, the legislation in the State party does not include a definition of domestic violence and does not provide effective legal protection against domestic violence. In that regard, the Committee recalls that, under article 3 of the Convention, States parties “shall __________________ 11 10/12 See also L.R. v. Republic of Moldova, para. 13.6. 17-21669