CCPR/C/123/D/2785/2016 9.7 The author further claims a violation of Mr. Humaam’s right to life under article 6 (1) of the Covenant, since he was sentenced to death after an unfair trial in violation of article 14 of the Covenant. The Committee notes that the State party has argued, with reference to article 6 (2) of the Covenant, that Mr. Humaam was sentenced to death for having committed serious crimes following the judgment handed down by the courts, in accordance with the Constitution and laws of Maldives and sharia, and that the imposition of the death penalty was not contrary to the Covenant. The Committee recalls its general comment No. 6 (1982) on article 6 (the right to life), in which it noted that the article 6 provision that a sentence of death may be imposed only in accordance with the law and not contrary to the provisions of the Covenant implies that the procedural guarantees prescribed by the Covenant must be observed, including the right to a fair hearing by an independent tribunal, the presumption of innocence, the minimum guarantees for the defence and the right to review by a higher tribunal. 21 It further reiterates its jurisprudence that the imposition of a sentence of death upon conclusion of a trial in which the provisions of article 14 of the Covenant have not been respected constitutes a violation of article 6 of the Covenant.22 In the light of its findings that the State party violated Mr. Humaam’s rights under article 14 as set out above, the Committee considers that, in sentencing Mr. Humaam to death following a trial that suffered from such deficiencies, the State party has violated its obligations under article 6 (1) of the Covenant. 9.8 In relation to the exercise of clemency, the Committee notes the author’s statement that, despite purported mandatory mediation with the family of the accused, the State party ignored a request by Mr. Ali’s family to stop the death penalty being carried out unless and until the murder investigation was properly concluded; that the new rules on clemency have in fact taken away the discretion of the President to grant clemency in the circumstances of this case and do not provide clear rules regarding the basis upon which the Supreme Court is able to stop an execution even if the family so requests; and that this process therefore contravenes Mr. Humaam’s rights under article 14 (1) of the Covenant. The Committee notes the State party’s arguments in this regard that mediation with the victim’s family is mandatory, that the author has misunderstood the provisions on clemency and the interplay with sharia, and that the judicial interpretation referred to by the author was specific to that case and does not affect Mr. Humaam’s case. 9.9 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that States parties are required, pursuant to article 6 (4) of the Covenant, to allow individuals sentenced to death to seek pardon or commutation; to ensure that amnesties, pardons and commutation can be granted to them in appropriate circumstances; and to ensure that sentences are not carried out before requests for pardon or commutation have been meaningfully considered and conclusively decided upon. No category of sentenced persons can be a priori excluded from such measures of relief, nor should the conditions for attainment of relief be ineffective, unnecessarily burdensome, discriminatory in nature or applied in an arbitrary manner. Article 6 (4) does not prescribe a particular procedure for the exercise of the right to seek pardon or commutation, and States parties consequently retain some discretion in spelling out the relevant procedures. Still, such procedures should be specified in domestic legislation. Moreover, clemency procedures must not afford the families of crime victims a preponderant role in determining whether the death sentence should be carried out. Furthermore, pardon or commutation procedures must offer certain essential guarantees, including: certainty about the processes followed and the substantive criteria applied; the right of individuals sentenced to death to initiate pardon or commutation procedures and to make representations about their personal or other relevant circumstances; the right to be informed in advance about when the request will be considered; and the right to be informed promptly about the outcome of the procedure. In the light of the lack of certainty in the law regarding the clemency process and its effectiveness, the Committee considers that the State party has not met its obligations under article 6 (4) of the Covenant. The Committee concludes that the author’s claims reveal a violation of article 6 (4) of the Covenant. 21 22 14 See general comment No. 6 (1982) on article 6 on the right to life, para. 7. Price v. Jamaica (CCPR/C/58/D/572/1994).