CCPR/C/123/D/2785/2016 6.3 As a result of Mr. Humaam’s confession, it was entirely proper that the judge refused to allow him to call any witnesses. Moreover, the author’s claim regarding witnesses appears to be based on the fact that one witness was discovered dead on 7 February 2013, before he could testify. This is an issue entirely out of the control of the court and therefore must be ignored. 6.4 A further witness was purportedly allowed to leave the country and travel abroad. It is unclear how this demonstrates that the defendant was prevented from presenting his case. The author does not clarify whether the individual was identified to the court as a witness prior to his departure from Maldives, or whether there was any procedural wrongdoing in allowing that witness to travel out of the country. Furthermore, the author does not suggest that the witness could have been compelled to give evidence on Mr. Humaam’s behalf even if he had remained in Maldives. The defence is responsible for securing the attendance of those they wish to call as witnesses, and failure to do so does not in any way infringe on the fair trial rights of a defendant. Whether a defence witness travels out of the country, or attends the trial or not, is out of the hands of the court. It is not for the court, the prosecution or the Government to dictate terms or to control which witnesses the defence calls. That is a matter entirely for the defence, and issue can only be taken if unsurmountable hurdles are placed in the way of the defence that constitute interference with the administration of justice. There is nothing to suggest that any disproportionate obstacles were placed in the way of the defence in this case. In addition, it is established law that a presiding judge has discretion about whether to allow witnesses or other evidence. 10 The question of relevance applies to all witnesses. 6.5 Although the prosecution redacted the names of certain witnesses, including two policemen whose identities were concealed in order to protect them from being influenced and to prevent any harm that might come to them, the judge had access to the real names of the witnesses and could confirm that their identities and testimonies were consistent, which ensured the credibility of their testimony. In the case Doorson v. the Netherlands, the European Court of Human Rights found that the decision not to disclose the identity of certain witnesses to the defence “was inspired by the need, as assessed by [the Amsterdam Court of Appeal], to obtain evidence from them while at the same time protecting them against the possibility of reprisals […] This is certainly a relevant reason to allow them anonymity”. The European Court of Human Rights also added that “although, as the applicant has stated, there has been no suggestion that [the anonymous witnesses] were ever threatened by the applicant himself, the decision to maintain their anonymity cannot be regarded as unreasonable per se”. In addition, although the testimony of these witnesses was important, they were not the sole deciding factor in the court’s decision. Their testimony was not essential in convicting Mr. Humaam but was corroboration of his twicemade confession. 6.6 The decisions of the Criminal Court, the High Court and the Supreme Court were not based solely on anonymous witnesses’ testimonies. There was also documentary evidence, testimony from non-anonymous witnesses and a confession. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) from Mr. Ali was also found during the tests conducted on Mr. Humaam’s jeans, and the defence team had the opportunity to cross-examine the DNA report. Finally, Mr. Humaam’s legal team was given the opportunity to question and cross-examine all witnesses during all the trial hearings in which the witnesses testified. Although the members of the defence team were unaware of the exact name of some of the witnesses, they were informed of all the relevant details of the investigation and were able to openly question the witnesses to verify the reliability and consistency of their testimony. 10 6 See Wright v. Jamaica (CCPR/C/45/D/349/1989), para. 8.4, in which the Human Rights Committee observed that, “with respect to the alleged violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (e), it is uncontested that the trial judge refused a request from counsel to call a witness on Mr. Wright’s behalf. It is not apparent, however, that the testimony sought from this witness would have buttressed the defence in respect of the charge of murder, as it merely concerned the nature of the inquiries allegedly inflicted on the author by a mob outside the Waterford police station. In the circumstances, the Committee finds no violation of this provision.”