Dismantling the Tools ofreport Oppression INTERPOL 2018 E. Analysis of reforms to date 63. The drivers identified in Section D above have led to significant reforms being adopted in relation to each of the main areas of concern identified by Fair Trials. Protection from abuse 64. We have limited information about the process and the substance of the reviews which INTERPOL conducts in relation to requests for INTERPOL alerts. INTERPOL does not publish guidance on how it approaches the review process, so we have little indication of the factors which are taken into account, making it difficult to determine whether, on the whole, it is doing a good job. Despite this opacity, we have been notified of reforms to the process through which reviews are conducted which indicate that efforts are being made to improve the mechanism for preventing ‘abusive’ INTERPOL alerts from getting on to INTERPOL’s databases. i) Review prior to publication 65. As explained above, Fair Trials found that INTERPOL’s ability to prevent abusive alerts from being circulated was compromised by the operation of the i-link system that made requests for Red Notices visible to NCBs before they were reviewed. This meant that, in practice, police forces across the world had access to information about wanted persons through INTERPOL’s channels, even before they had been checked for compliance with INTERPOL’s rules. 66. INTERPOL confirmed to Fair Trials in March 2015 that requests for Red Notices are no longer to be visible to NCBs until they have been reviewed by INTERPOL, providing the General Secretariat with the opportunity to weed out cases of abuse before they are circulated to police forces in all Member States. From a procedural perspective this is a significant improvement, given the ease with which Member States could previously circulate information about innocent people without scrutiny. 67. Problems remain, however, in relation to Diffusions, which can be sent directly between Member States. Diffusions are not dissimilar to emails which are sent by one NCB to all or some other NCBs without the need for prior approval from the General Secretariat. INTERPOL does review Diffusions, but only after they have been circulated in this way. If an NCB receives a Diffusion, it may (but does not have to) check the name against INTERPOL’s databases, and if the Diffusion has still not been approved by INTERPOL at this point, this will be evident. If INTERPOL does not approve the Diffusion, a message is circulated to all NCBs advising them of this decision and requesting that NCBs should not use INTERPOL’s channels to act upon that Diffusion. It remains possible, however, for NCBs to act on the Diffusion in a bilateral manner. 68. While Diffusions are not formal INTERPOL notices per se, they can and often do serve the same function as Red Notices, by requesting the location and arrest of wanted persons. Even if they are intended to be less formal than Red Notices, it is up to Member States to determine the extent to which there is a difference in the injunctive value between the two types of alerts. This means that in practice, Diffusions, much like Red Notices, often trigger arrests and extradition proceedings. 69. Whereas INTERPOL has now put in place procedures to check Red Notices before their contents become visible to NCBs, similar measures have not been adopted to check the contents of Diffusions before they are circulated. We have concerns 31