CEDAW/C/58/D/47/2012 services pointed to the likelihood that there were inappropriate situations consisting of repeated questions by the father of the daughter concerning the private life of the mother, as well as the need to maintain continuous monitoring of the visit regime. The Committee also observes that F.R.C., from the start of the separation, systematically and without reasonable justification shirked his obligation to provide child support. Although the author complained of this situation repeatedly, adducing her difficult economic situation, it was not until 13 February 2003 that the judicial authorities took measures to garnish F.R.C.’s wages. Similarly, the author had to wait three years for the court to hold a hearing concerning her request for the use of the marital dwelling. 9.4 The Committee observes that during the time when the regime of judicially determined visits was being applied, both the judicial authorities and the social services and psychological experts had as their main purpose normalizing relations between father and daughter, despite the reservations expressed by those two services on the conduct of F.R.C. The relevant decisions do not disclose an interest by those authorities in evaluating all aspects of the benefits or harms to the child of the regime applied. It is also noteworthy that the decision which ushered in a regime of unsupervised visits was adopted without a prior hearing of the author and her daughter, and that the continued non-payment of child support by F.R.C. was not taken into account in that context. All of these elements reflect a pattern of action which responds to a stereotyped conception of visiting rights based on formal equality which, in the present case, gave clear advantages to the father despite his abusive conduct and minimized the situation of mother and daughter as victims of violence, placing them in a vulnerable position. In this connection, the Committee recalls that in matters of child custody and visiting rights, the best interests of the child must be a central concern and that when national authorities adopt decisions in that regard they must take into account the existence of a context of domestic violence. 9.5 The Committee considers that the authorities of the State party initially took actions to protect the child in a context of domestic violence. However, the decision to allow unsupervised visits was taken without the necessary safeguards and without taking into account that the pattern of domestic violence that had characterized family relations for years, unquestioned by the State party, was still present. It is enough to recall in that regard that the judicial decision of 17 June 2002 referred to certain improper actions by F.R.C. in regard to his daughter; that at the time F.R.C. continued not to pay child support with impunity; and that he continued using the family dwelling in spite of the author’s claims in that regard. 9.6 The Committee recalls its general recommendation No. 19 (1992), according to which gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under human rights conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention. 5 This discrimination is not limited to acts committed by or on behalf of Governments. Thus, for example, under article 2 (e) of the Convention, States parties commit to taking all appropriate steps to eliminate discrimination against women practised by any person, organization or enterprise. On this basis, the Committee considers that States may also be responsible for acts of private persons if they do not act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence and to compensate victims. 6 5 6 16 General recommendation No. 19 (1992) on violence against women, paras. 6 and 7. Ibid, para. 9. 14-59288