A/57/173 interference with evidence or alerting another suspect. Particularly in circumstances ... where their compatibility with articles 9 and 14 inter alia is suspect, and where other less intrusive means for achieving the same ends exist, the Committee considers that the State party has failed to justify these powers.5” 11. The Special Rapporteur notes that regional human rights bodies have reached similar conclusions. The European Court on Human Rights, in relation with article 5, paragraph 3 (the right to be promptly brought before a judge) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, stated in the case of Brogan and others versus the United Kingdom that the investigation of terrorist offences undoubtedly presented the authorities with special problems. The Court accepted that, subject to the existence of adequate safeguards, the context of terrorism in Northern Ireland had the effect of prolonging the period during which the authorities might, without violating article 5, paragraph 3, keep a person suspected of serious terrorist offences in custody before bringing him before a judge or other judicial officer. The Court indicated that the scope for flexibility in interpreting and applying the notion of “promptness” was very limited. In the Court’s view, even the shortest of the four periods of detention, namely the four days and six hours spent in police custody, fell outside the strict constraints as to time permitted by the first part of article 5 paragraph 3. 6 The European Court of Human Rights further indicated that the word “promptly” could not be widely interpreted without seriously weakening a procedural guarantee to the detriment of the individual and the very essence of the right to be free from arbitrary arrest, even if public security were at stake. The Court stated that the undoubted fact that the arrest and detention of the applicants had been inspired by the legitimate aim of protecting the community as a whole from terrorism was not on its own sufficient to ensure compliance with the specific requirements of article 5, paragraph 3.7 12. With respect to the adequate safeguards referred to above, the European Court decided in the case of Brannigan and McBride versus the United Kingdom that the following elements were adequate and sufficient safeguards against abuse: (a) the remedy of habeas corpus is available to test the lawfulness of the original arrest and detention, and it provides an important measure of protection against arbitrary detention; and (b) detainees have an absolute and 6 legally enforceable right to consult a solicitor after forty-eight hours from the time of arrest. Moreover, within that period the exercise of this right can only be delayed where there exists reasonable grounds for doing so. In the Court’s view, it was clear that the decision to delay access to a solicitor was susceptible to judicial review and that in such proceedings the burden of establishing reasonable grounds for doing so rested on the authorities. The Court also stated that it was not disputed that detainees are entitled to inform a relative or friend about their detention and to have access to a doctor. 8 The right to habeas corpus and a very limited period of incommunicado detention, that is, 48 hours, seemed to constitute the core legal safeguards to be guaranteed to anyone under arrest. 13. In the case of Aksoy versus Turkey, the European Court on Human Rights confirmed that measures aimed at derogating the right to habeas corpus (it must be recalled that Turkey had deposited a notification of derogation in respect of article 5, paragraph 3) would in any case not fulfil the criteria set up in the provision allowing derogations from certain rights in time of public emergency, that is, to be strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. The Court stated that it had taken account of the unquestionably serious problem of terrorism in South-east Turkey and the difficulties faced by the State in taking effective measures against it. However, it was not persuaded that the exigencies of the situation necessitated the holding of the applicant on suspicion of involvement in terrorist offences for fourteen days or more in incommunicado detention without access to a judge or other judicial officer.9 The Court further stated that the denial of access to a lawyer, doctor, relative or friend and the absence of any realistic possibility of being brought before a court to test the legality of the detention meant that the applicant was left completely at the mercy of those holding him. 10 14. Similarly, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights in its advisory opinion on Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations concluded unanimously that the right to habeas corpus cannot be suspended because it is a judicial guarantee essential for the protection of the rights and freedoms whose suspension is prohibited under the American Convention on Human Rights. In particular, the Inter-American Court stated that, in order for habeas corpus to achieve its purpose, which is to obtain a judicial determination of the lawfulness of a detention, it is necessary that the detained person be