CAT/OP/PRT/2 observations on existing legislation or draft legislation relating to matters under the Optional Protocol.2 13. In order to fulfil its functions, a Support Structure3 is established to assist the NPM in performing its tasks, namely, identifying places of detention, planning and conducting visits and the acquisition and analysis of data. This Support Structure is composed of Advisory Council, Steering Committee and Visitors Team. The Advisory Council is comprised of 12 members, including the presiding Ombudsman. Six of them are appointed by the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guarantees, the High Council of the Judiciary, the High Council of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Bar Association, the Medical Association and the Psychologists Association. The Steering Committee is composed of three persons and it develops the annual activity plan and plans the NPM visits. In most of the visits, one member of the Steering Committee is present. The Visitors Team, which carries out visits to the places of detention, is composed of Ombudsperson’s staff members appointed for that purpose on account of their experience and knowledge.4 According to the information provided to the SPT prior to the visit5, the Visiting Team is composed of 9 members of the Ombudsperson’s team. 14. Due to the lack of the dedicated budget for the NPM, the Ombudsperson has to allocate its regular resources for performing the tasks of the NPM. There are no explicit provisions in the NPM legislation regarding earmarked funding. This means that there is no specific economic framework or ring-fenced budget provided for the mechanism. In this connection the SPT underlines that the lack of budgetary independence has a negative impact on the independent functioning of the NPM. 15. While there is no single model for an OPCAT-compliant national preventive mechanism structure, it is clear that when national human rights institutions are designated as national preventive mechanisms their particular structures must be examined in order to ensure that the mechanism can fulfil its mandate according to the OPCAT. Experience suggests that a national preventive mechanism can most effectively exercise its mandate when it is established as a separate unit within the national human rights institution. In Portugal this is not the case. Moreover, the NPM of Portugal should have full operational autonomy with regard to its staff, but it does not. The mechanism does not have any staff working exclusively for it. All the members of the NPM team are combining their NPM functions with those of NHRI. That situation makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for the mechanism to take a systematic and planned approach to torture prevention in the country. 16. The SPT welcomes the fact that NPM, regardless of the scarce resources and limitations due to the way in which it is organized, has been operational for almost five years, has conducted unannounced and announced visits to places of deprivation of liberty in Portugal and published its annual reports, some of which have been shared with the Subcommittee. III. Recommendations to the national preventive mechanism A. Recommendations relating to institutional and structural issues Structure and independence 17. As a general observation, the Subcommittee notes that the national preventive mechanism of Portugal does not have an identity distinct from the Ombudsperson, not only with respect to its own resources but also in relation to its institutional framework and guarantees of independence. While the Optional Protocol does not provide for a unique model 2 3 4 5 NPM Annual Report 2015, para. 1.3, http://www.provedorjus.pt/site/public/archive/doc/NPM_2015_ING__0.pdf, http://www.provedor-jus.pt/site/public/archive/doc/Regulamento_EMNP_0.pdf NPM Annual Report 2015, para. 1.3, http://www.provedorjus.pt/site/public/archive/doc/NPM_2015_ING__0.pdf NPM assessment matrix for NPMs filled in by the NPM 4