CCPR/C/113/D/2000/2010 8.2 When it states that the investigation in Mr. Katwal’s case is ongoing, the State party is simply reiterating the information it provided in 2011. Notwithstanding the Committee’s conclusion that non-judicial mechanisms, such as truth commissions, should not be considered as domestic remedies to be exhausted for admissibility purposes, the State party continues to argue that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is a necessary domestic procedure to exhaust. In this regard the author stresses that although the President of Nepal approved the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act on 11 May 2014, on the one hand this Act breaches international law and, on the other, no transitional justice mechanism had been established at the time of submission of the author’s comments. Moreover, when the State party submitted its observations on the merits, the Act had not yet been signed and it was not known whether or when the transitional justice mechanism would be established. The State party was thus asking the author to exhaust a non-existent remedy. The author reiterates that the prosecution of those responsible for gross human rights violations cannot depend on the establishment of a transitional justice mechanism, and that the arguments of the State party in that regard lack legal basis. She refers to the Committee’s concluding observations on the State party’s second periodic report under the Covenant, in which the Committee pointed out that not a single conflict-related case had been successfully prosecuted through the criminal justice system (see CCPR/C/NPL/CO/2, para. 5 (a)). 8.3 The author claims that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act breaches international law and contravenes the Supreme Court��s decision of 2 January 2014.22 She identifies several major flaws of the Act: the Commission has a mandate to conduct mediation to reconcile victims and perpetrators even in cases of gross human rights violations (section 22) and any legal action is prohibited in mediated cases; the Commission has the power to recommend amnesties even for those involved in crimes under international law and gross human rights violations (section 26); there is a lack of criminalization of offences that amount to crimes under international law; the system of referral to prosecution mechanisms is inadequate; and the rights of victims to reparation are not recognized (sections 2 (e) and 23). In the light of the above, unless the Act is amended, it does not offer an effective remedy. 8.4 The author contends that the State party’s observation that a criminal investigation is ongoing and that the author will obtain redress after its conclusion. She states that she has been waiting for more than 13 years to learn the truth about the fate of her husband and the State party suggests she has to wait longer, for an indefinite period. 8.5 Lastly, the author submits that the State party has not refuted any of her complaints on the merits and in this light asks the Committee to consider as established the facts described in her original communication. Further submission by the State party 9. By note verbale of 11 August 2014, the State party informed the Committee that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act had been enacted in 2014 and that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Enforced Disappearance Commission would be established soon. The State party also submits that the bills to criminalize torture and enforced disappearance have been drafted and are in the process of resubmission to Parliament. The State party reiterates its position that the criminal justice system cannot provide full remedy to the victims of conflict without the transitional justice mechanisms and assures the Committee that the author’s claims will be addressed fully after the establishment of the said mechanisms. 22 The date of the Supreme Court decision in the State party’s observation on merits is given as 2 April 2014. 13