considered when doing so. Furthermore, although the Foreign Ministry may issue an opinion on requests to export ‘Class I’ products, • Specifically: the Ministry has no power to prevent the export of these products since by definition they do not require preliminary authorisation. In practice, therefore, oversight of the export of these products is almost entirely the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence, which alone has the power to grant export licenses. Analysis of export requests under PNENEM (see above) reveals that the Foreign Ministry is usually the body that intervenes in the • Reclassify pistols, shotguns and electric shock weapons from Class I to Class II • Amend and update the Liprode to include all types of law enforcement equipment and weapons featured in this report, including restraints, and handheld kinetic impact weapons. export process for reasons connected to human rights. By removing the need for exporters of ‘Class I’ products to request preliminary authorisation, therefore, the policy risks effectively negating the role of the Foreign • • data and documents related to the export and import operations within [its] competence’176. Article 38 of the • Publish regular activity reports on the import and export of law enforcement equipment and technical assistance. These reports should include information on the number of policy similarly explains that the information related to the export and import processes are considered to be applications received, the items involved, the country of destination and the proposed of restricted access177. Arguments in favour of a lack of transparency are often justified on the grounds of end-user, the outcome of each application, and the total value of the transfer. commercial confidentiality or national security. However, examples from other countries, including member states of the EU, demonstrate that states can be transparent regarding their exports without breaching the Make publicly available details of how the criteria used to assess the appropriateness of exports are evaluated, including sources used. Finally, the policy does not appear to require the State to publish reports detailing authorized export data. Article 5(9), for example, states that the Ministry of Defence keep under ‘custody and preserve the confidentiality of Make publicly available details of the criteria and process used to classify defence products as either ‘Class I’ or ‘Class II’. Ministry in assessing the export of these goods, thereby limiting the consideration of human rights obligations as part of the export process. Take steps to address the weaknesses of PNEIPRODE identified by this report. Omega calls on APEX and ABIMDE to: commercial confidentiality or competitiveness of the companies involved, or jeopardising national security. In order for civil society actors and other relevant groups to be able to provide effective oversight of the process, • it is essential that information about the implementation of the policy is made publicly available. Work closely with Brazilian companies to ensure compliance with local regulation when participating in international arms exhibitions. Omega calls on companies involved in the production and trade of law enforcement equipment to: Recommendations Omega calls on national authorities in Brazil to: • Prohibit the promotion, import or export of law enforcement of equipment which has no practical use other than for the purpose of inflicting torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment183. • Immediately suspend and deny export licences where there are credible allegations that • Put in place robust due diligence mechanisms to assess actual and potential human rights impacts resulting from the production and/or trade of law enforcement equipment, integrate and act upon the findings, track responses, and communicate how any impacts are being addressed. Omega calls on companies involved in the organisation and hosting of law enforcement and security trade events to: • Develop and implement procedures and policies to prevent the promotion of inherently abusive equipment at their events. the end users have recently used such equipment to commit or facilitate serious human rights violations, or where there is a substantial risk of serious human rights violations being perpetrated with such equipment. • Submit an initial report to the UNODA as soon as possible, in compliance with the reporting requirements of the ATT. 60  61