CAT/C/61/D/654/2015 refused to withdraw from the case by redefining the offence as a crime. Moreover, since the opening of the proceedings, the trial has been repeatedly deferred, either at the request of the defence, which has been trying to gain time, or because of the absence of one of the accused from the hearing, allegedly on account of ill-health or simply because of a downright refusal to appear in court. All requests for postponement of hearings have been accepted. Furthermore, the complainant was contacted several times by relatives of the accused who tried to persuade him to withdraw his charges. More recently, he began to receive anonymous phone calls threatening to return him to prison. Conclusions concerning the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies 2.22 According to the complainant, he sought to pursue available domestic remedies, but they proved ineffective and fruitless, 5 since no effective investigation was undertaken into the torture suffered. He points out that he repeatedly complained of the torture suffered during his custody, initially to the first investigating judge before whom he appeared on 4 September 1993, after 37 days of arbitrary detention and torture at the Ministry of the Interior. The judge refused to take the case because of the deplorable state of the accused and the weakness of the case file submitted against them. Rached Jaïdane reiterated his complaints during his appearance before the second investigating judge in late September 1993, but they were ignored. During both interviews with the investigating judges, Rached Jaïdane bore clear traces of torture. Despite his allegations and visible traces of torture, the two judges failed to report the crime. The torture continued throughout his 13 years of imprisonment. It was only after the revolution that Rached Jaïdane finally hoped to secure justice for the ill-treatment he had suffered. He filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance in Tunis on 3 June 2011 and finally secured the opening of an investigation, which closed on 16 February 2012. However, the third investigating judge at the Tunis Court, when presented with the case file, failed to undertake a diligent investigation, as already noted. The victim is clearly confronted with passivity on the part of the Tunisian authorities and an obvious lack of due diligence in handling the case. 2.23 The complainant adds that it may be concluded from the general climate of impunity that still prevails in Tunisia for serious violations of human rights, including acts of torture, that he is unlikely to win his case before the national courts. The shortcomings of the judicial system have a disquieting impact on the prosecution of serious crimes, including acts of torture. In light of the outcome of all the steps taken by Rached Jaïdane to secure justice, the complainant requests the Committee to confirm that he sought to pursue available domestic remedies but that they proved to be objectively ineffective, partial and futile, and that reasonable time limits were exceeded.6 More than 21 years after the facts, the case has still not been considered with a view to prosecuting and punishing the alleged perpetrators. In light of the Committee’s jurisprudence, such a delay is manifestly excessive. Accordingly, the delay of more than 18 years in launching an investigation into the allegations of torture, and the period of more than 35 months that elapsed from the beginning of the legal proceedings without an effective examination of the case leading to the prosecution and punishment of all perpetrators, and to reparations for the victim, constitute unreasonable delays justifying the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. The complaint 3.1 The complainant alleges that articles 1, 2 (1), 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 have been violated. 5 6 6 Communication No. 59/1996, Blanco Abad v. Spain, Views adopted on 14 May 1998, para. 8.8. See also communications Nos. 368/2008, Sonko v. Spain, decision adopted on 25 November 2011, para. 10.7; and 261/2005, Osmani v. Serbia, decision adopted on 8 May 2009, para. 10.7. The complainant refers to the case of Blanco Abad v. Spain, in which the delay of 19 days before launching an investigation and the period of 10 months taken to conduct the investigations were deemed to be excessive by the Committee. GE.17-16785