CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 4.7 If any finding were made in this case, in the absence of the actual actions of State agents, on the basis of evolved constitutional and legal principles, that would represent a significant difference in kind (as opposed to a difference in degree), in the jurisprudence of the Committee. That would be contrary to paragraph 2 of the Committee’s general comment No. 20 (1992) on the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, in which the Committee stipulates that it is the duty of the State party to afford everyone protection through legislative and other measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity. There was no act of “infliction” by any person or State agent and therefore there was no cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 4.8 The State party states that it has not engaged in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment on the basis that: (a) The communication is actually and factually distinct from the cases relied on by the author; (b) In circumstances in which the author’s life was not in danger, the procedure for obtaining a lawful abortion in Ireland was clear. The decision was made by a patient in consultation with her doctor. If the patient did not agree, she was free to seek another medical opinion and, in the last resort, she could make an emergency application to the High Court. There is no factual evidence that State agents were responsible for any arbitrary interference with the decision-making process, or that they were responsible for any act of “infliction”; (c) The grounds for lawful abortion were well known and applied by virtue of article 40.3.3 of the Constitution, the grounds as elucidated by the Supreme Court in the case of Attorney General v. X and others, the Medical Council guidelines and the crisis pregnancy guidelines; (d) While the author states that she was aware that abortion was not allowed, but had no idea that a termination on medical grounds would fall into the same category, that was her subjective understanding of the law; (e) The hospital and its staff were clear in their view that a termination was not possible in Ireland and therefore no arbitrary decision-making processes or acts of infliction can be suggested which caused or contributed to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; (f) The State party’s position and stance in relation to its law sought to achieve a reasonable, careful and difficult balance of competing rights as between the fetus and the woman; (g) Covenant. The State party sought that balance in accordance with article 25 of the Claims under article 17 4.9 The author’s privacy rights under article 17 of the Covenant were not violated. If there was any interference with her privacy it was neither arbitrary nor unlawful. Rather, it was proportionate to the legitimate aims of the Covenant, taking into account a careful balance between the right to life of the fetus with due regard to that of the woman. The advice given to the author by the hospital was properly and lawfully given. The State party is permitted to create laws, in accordance with and in the spirit of article 25 of the Covenant, which allow for a balancing of competing rights. 4.10 In the case of A, B and C v. Ireland, the European Court of Human Rights found the following: “having regard to the right to lawfully travel abroad for an abortion with access 10