CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 impairment to term, versus women who terminate such pregnancies, reflects a stereotypical idea that a pregnant woman should let nature run its course, regardless of the suffering involved for her (para. 3.19). 5. The State party in turn contends that the criminalization of abortion cannot discriminate against women, per se, because any differential treatment is based on factual biological differences between men and women. It argues alternatively that any genderbased differential treatment of woman pursues the legitimate aim of protecting the foetus, is proportionate to that aim, and thus is not discrimination (paras. 4.13-4.15). 6. The view that differences in treatment that are based on biological differences unique to either men or women cannot be sex discrimination is inconsistent with contemporary international human rights law and the positions of this Committee. Under such an approach, apparently it would be perfectly acceptable for a State to deny health care coverage for essential medical care uniquely required by one sex, such as cervical cancer, even if all other forms of cancer (including prostate cancer for men) were covered. Such a distinction would not, under this view, treat men and women differently, because only women contract cervical cancer, as a result of biological differences unique to women. Thus there would be no comparable way in which men were treated differently. 7. Modern gender discrimination law is not so limited. The right to sex and gender equality and non-discrimination obligates States to ensure that State regulations, including with respect to access to health services, accommodate the fundamental biological differences between men and women in reproduction and do not directly or indirectly discriminate on the basis of sex. They thus require States to protect on an equal basis, in law and in practice, the unique needs of each sex. In particular, as this Committee has recognized, nondiscrimination on the basis of sex and gender obligates States to adopt c measures to achieve the “effective and equal empowerment of women” . 8. Article 26 requires “equal and effective” protection against discrimination on grounds of sex. The Committee has drawn upon the Race Convention and CEDAW to define discrimination as prohibiting “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as … sex…, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal d footing, of all rights and freedoms” . Article 26 prohibits discrimination in law or in fact in e any field regulated and protected by public authorities , and does not require an intent to discriminate. Violations can “result from the discriminatory effect of a rule or measure that f is neutral at face value or without intent to discriminate” . Thus, “indirect discrimination” contravenes the Covenant “if the detrimental effects of a rule or decision exclusively or disproportionately affect persons” with a protected characteristic and the “rules or decisions g with such an impact” are not “based on objective and reasonable grounds” . 9. State policies that treat or impact men and women differently as a result of h biological differences are obviously “based on … sex” . Such distinctions necessarily c d e f g h General Comment No. 28, Equality of rights between men and women (article 3) (2000), para. 8. General Comment No. 18, Non-discrimination (1994), paras. 6-7 (emphasis added). Id., para. 12. Communication No. 998/2001, Althammer v. Austria (Views adopted 8 August 2003), para. 10.2; see also Communication No. 172/1984, Broeks v. The Netherlands (Views adopted 9 April 1987), paras. 15-16 (finding a violation of article 26 although the “the State party had not intended to discriminate against women”). Ibid. Cf. Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassensen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, [1990] 1 E.C.R. 3941, [1991] I.R.L.R. 27 (“[O]nly women can be refused employment on the grounds of 21