CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 3.25 Even in the improbable event that the Court would have found that the author’s fetus did not constitute “unborn life”, the Court would have been highly unlikely to conclude that the author thereby had a constitutional right to a termination of pregnancy. She would have had to invoke other constitutional provisions to claim such a right, most notably article 40.3, which protects unenumerated personal rights. However, such rights may also apply to, and be invoked on behalf of, the fetus. Furthermore, the author was 21 weeks pregnant when she learned that the fetus had a fatal condition. Even if the courts had prioritized her case, it is unlikely that they would have been able to render a decision as swiftly as required in the circumstances. 3.26 Regarding her right to information, the Supreme Court has affirmed that the regulation of the Abortion Information Act is constitutional and has thereby made it immune to future constitutional challenges. It follows that the author could not have had any reasonable prospect of challenging this Act. 3.27 A petition addressed to a court for a termination of her pregnancy would have been ineffective and inadequate. In the extremely unlikely event that a court found that she had a legal right to access abortion in Ireland, the author would have been unable to terminate her pregnancy there. In order to have an abortion, the author would have had to obtain a mandamus order to compel the State to perform a legal duty of a public nature, which must be explicit and unambiguous. Furthermore, the courts would have been extremely reluctant to order the Executive to provide the author with a termination of pregnancy, as this would be incompatible with the separation of powers doctrine. The available remedies would also have been inadequate, in that they would have compounded the author’s mental suffering by forcing her to undergo public litigation, which would have exposed her to public hostility. 3.28 Finally, the author could have challenged the abortion ban by making an application under the European Convention on Human Rights Act. However, under the Act the author could only have sought a declaration of incompatibility and for an associated ex gratia award of damages. She would not have been able to seek a mandamus order ensuring her access to a termination, let alone in a timely manner. 3.29 No effective and adequate domestic remedies were available after the author terminated her pregnancy abroad. She would have had two hypothetical options for challenging the Irish abortion ban. First, she could have petitioned an Irish court to engage in an abstract review of the constitutionality of the ban. The court would most likely have declined to adjudicate her claim on the basis that it was moot, since she no longer needed an abortion. Secondly, she could have complained under the Human Rights Act that the abortion violated her rights. As indicated above, the review could at most have resulted in a declaration of incompatibility and an ex gratia award of compensation, and would not be an effective or adequate remedy. State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits 4.1 The State party submitted observations on 10 July 2014 and 21 July 2015. It indicated that it does not take issue with the admissibility of the author’s complaint. 4.2 The State party asserts that article 40.3.3 of the Constitution represents the profound moral choice of the Irish people. Yet, at the same time, the Irish people have acknowledged the entitlement of citizens to travel to other jurisdictions for the purposes of obtaining terminations of pregnancy. The legislative framework guarantees the citizens’ entitlement to information in relation to abortion services provided abroad. Thus, the constitutional and legislative framework reflects the nuanced and proportionate approach to the considered views of the Irish electorate on the profound moral question of the extent to which the right to life of the fetus should be protected and balanced against the rights of the woman. 8