CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 4.3 The State party provided a detailed overview of the Irish legislative and regulatory framework in relation to abortion and termination of pregnancy. It also referred to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case A, B and C v. Ireland.4 Having regard to the fact that Irish law permitted travel abroad for the purposes of abortion, and appropriate access to information and health care was provided, the European Court did not consider that the prohibition on abortion for reasons of health and/or well-being exceeded the margin of appreciation accorded to Member States. The Court struck a fair balance between the privacy rights of A and B and the rights invoked on behalf of the fetus, which were based upon the profound moral views of the Irish people about the nature of life. The Court found that there had been a violation of the applicant’s right to private and family life contrary to article 8 of the European Convention in the case of applicant C, in that there had been no accessible and effective procedure to enable her to establish whether she qualified for a lawful termination of pregnancy. 4.4 Following that judgment the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 was adopted. The Act deals with situations, inter alia, where termination of the life of the fetus is permitted in cases of a threat to the life of the woman owing to physical illness and in emergencies, as well as in situations where there is a real and substantial risk of loss of the woman’s life by way of suicide. It reaffirms an individual’s right to travel to another State and the right to obtain and make available information relating to services lawfully available in another State. It makes it an offence to destroy unborn human life intentionally, which can attract a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years. 4.5 The Irish regime may reflect concerns of which account is taken by article 6 of the Covenant. That provision has the potential to afford the fetus a right to life, which is deserving of protection. It cannot be definitively concluded that no measure of protection in relation to the right to life is afforded to the fetus, as otherwise article 6 (5) would lack sufficiency of meaning, reason and substance. Contrary to the author’s opinion, at the current time no conclusion regarding the application of the Covenant to prenatal rights exists in circumstances where relevant and material facts and context have yet to present themselves for consideration by the Committee. Claims under article 7 4.6 The author was not subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. In K.L. v. Peru, the specific actions of State agents were the direct causal action found to be arbitrary interference with the rights of the author, which denied her access to a lawfully available therapeutic abortion.5 In the present case, the author was not denied access to lawful abortion. She could not avail herself of such a procedure and that was communicated to her clearly and properly by the relevant State agents. She was then appropriately referred to the family planning facility to exercise her existing legal options. Accordingly, and contrary to what occurred in the case of K.L. v. Peru, there were no actions on the part of State agents that were or could be described as having been based on the personal prejudices of officials in the health system. 6 Thus, it cannot be stated that there was any arbitrary interference with any right of the author and which led to or resulted in cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 4 5 6 Application No. 25579/05, 16 December 2010. See communication No. 1153/2003, K.L. v. Peru, Views adopted on 24 October 2005. According to the State party, the same argument applies with respect to the Views of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in communication No. 22/2009, L.C. v. Peru, adopted on 17 October 2011 and the Human Rights Committee in communication No. 1608/2007, L.M.R. v. Argentina, Views adopted on 29 March 2011. 9