CAT/C/71/D/792/2016 article 3 of the Convention, the complainant has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to show that her engagement in advocacy activities has been of such significance that she would attract the attention of the Ugandan authorities. 8.12 The Committee notes the complainant’s argument that the Refugee Appeals Board failed to consider the risks she could face as a result of the disclosure of her name and photograph in the article of a Ugandan gossip publication. The Committee also notes, however, that, in its decision of 30 May 2017, the Board examined this circumstance and concluded that it did not place the complainant at risk of being subjected to torture if returned to Uganda because a number of organizations, mainly in Kampala, were actively and openly discussing the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons and pursuing related rights cases before the courts and because lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex issues were being discussed openly in large towns. 8.13 The Committee notes that, in line with article 3 (2) of the Convention, in order to determine whether there are grounds for believing that a person would be in danger of being subjected to torture if returned to another State, the competent authorities should take into account the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights, including harassment and violence against minority groups. 25 The Committee notes with concern the reports of human rights violations committed against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in Uganda. The Committee recalls, however, that the occurrence of human rights violations in a complainant’s country of origin is not sufficient in itself to conclude that he or she runs a personal risk of torture upon return to that country. Therefore, the mere fact that the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons are reportedly violated in Uganda is not in itself sufficient to conclude that the complainant’s removal to that country would constitute a violation of article 3 of the Convention.26 8.14 The Committee recalls that it is generally for the instances of States parties to the Convention to review or evaluate facts and evidence in order to determine the existence of danger of persecution.27 It appears from the information available to the Committee that the Danish authorities took into consideration a large amount of background information and concluded that lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons were not subjected to targeted abuse by Ugandan authorities or by the general public. The Committee notes that, while she disagrees with the factual conclusions of the State party’s authorities, the complainant has not shown that they were arbitrary, manifestly erroneous or amounted to a denial of justice.28 8.15 In the light of the above considerations, and on the basis of all the information submitted by the parties, including on the general situation of human rights in Uganda, the Committee considers that the complainant has not adequately demonstrated the existence of substantial grounds for believing that her return to Uganda would expose her to a real, foreseeable and personal risk of torture contrary to article 3 of the Convention. 8.16 The Committee, acting under article 22 (7) of the Convention, concludes that the complainant’s removal to Uganda by the State party would not constitute a violation of article 3 of the Convention. 25 26 27 28 12 Ibid., para. 43. See H.R.E.S v. Switzerland. For similar conclusions of the Human Rights Committee, see W.K. v. Canada. See also Human Rights Committee, X. v. Sweden, para. 9.2. See also Human Rights Committee, W.K. v. Canada, para. 10.5.