CAT/OP/TUR/1 Subcommittee. This significantly limits the effectiveness of the mechanism, including as regards the follow-up to its recommendations with the authorities. The Subcommittee also notes that the Code of Criminal Procedure of the State party does not explicitly authorize the mechanism to access the files of detainees, including those awaiting trial, such as detainee and incident registers and medical files. 20. The Subcommittee also notes the national preventive mechanism’s primary focus on monitoring functions while other mechanism functions, such as advocacy, awarenessraising, commenting on existing and draft legislation, and capacity-building are underdeveloped. This may result in part from the lack of specific legislation providing the mechanism with such authority and with the corresponding human resources for carrying out outward-facing mechanism functions, in addition to its visiting mandate. 21. While the institutional format of the national preventive mechanism is left to the State party’s discretion, it is imperative that the State party enact legislation that guarantees a mechanism that is in full compliance with the Optional Protocol and the mechanism guidelines of the Subcommittee. The Subcommittee recommends that the State party review the Code of Criminal Procedure and other relevant legislation so that, if necessary, it may be amended to harmonize it with the mechanism’s legal framework and enable the mechanism to effectively fulfil its preventive mandate under the Optional Protocol.2 In addition, the Subcommittee considers it crucial that the State party ensure the full, effective and meaningful participation of the different political parties represented in Parliament and civil society organizations with relevant expertise on torture prevention throughout the process of drafting the mechanism law and reviewing related legislation. 22. The Subcommittee wishes to emphasize the importance that the national preventive mechanism be granted, by means of this legislation, core mechanism functions, such as: (a) The power to regularly examine the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty in all places of detention, as defined in article 4 of the Optional Protocol, including prompt, regular and unhindered access to all information relating to persons deprived of their liberty deemed relevant by the mechanism, in accordance with article 20 (b) of the Optional Protocol; (b) The mandate to issue recommendations to the relevant authorities; (c) A corresponding duty on the part of the concerned authorities to enter into a dialogue with the mechanism on follow-up to its recommendations. The mechanism’s legal framework should also provide for the outward-facing functions of the mechanism, such as submitting proposals and observations on existing and draft legislation, advocacy, awareness-raising and capacity-building, and require a separate budget line in the State budget for the funding of the mechanism, in order to ensure its continuous financial and operational autonomy. Moreover, it should outline privileges and immunities of mechanism members and those who contribute to the mechanism, including experts and civil society, while guaranteeing protection for persons who provide information to it. Independence 23. The issue of independence, while a sensitive one, is a fundamental concern for the Subcommittee. In this regard, the Subcommittee notes with concern (a) the lack of known selection criteria for the membership of the national preventive mechanism, (b) appointments being made largely at the discretion of the executive branch with little outreach to the public and civil society, and (c) the lack of a pluralist and multidisciplinary approach to representation on the mechanism. The Subcommittee reminds the State party that its current practice is not in conformity with the mechanism guidelines of the Subcommittee and the Optional Protocol, as members of the mechanism are not selected through an open, transparent and inclusive process. 2 See, in particular, article 20 of the Optional Protocol. 5