CAT/C/39/D/297/2006 page 10 6.14 Counsel recalls the absolute prohibition in international law on return of a person at risk of torture7 and claims that the return of the complainant is a deliberate and direct violation of the State party’s international obligations and of article 3 of the Convention. 6.15 In counsel’s view, therefore, the return of the complainant notwithstanding the decisions establishing a risk of torture and persecution, the absence of any new circumstances, the Committee’s request for interim measures, the complainant’s state of health and the evidence that there is a current risk of torture is unconstitutional and a direct violation of article 3 of the Convention. This conclusion is borne out by the fact that the complainant was arrested on arrival in India, had serious charges brought against him and was beaten and threatened by the Indian authorities. Further comments by the parties 7.1 On 26 July 2007 the State party asserted that the only relevant point the Committee had to determine was whether, at the time of the complainant’s return, there were substantial reasons to believe that he would personally be at risk of torture in India. Counsel’s contentions in respect of various stages of the pre-removal procedure are incompatible ratione materiae with article 3 of the Convention. The State party recalls that article 3 does not recognize the right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal, the right to be properly represented by counsel or the right to know the evidence against one. The claims that the decisions rejecting the complainant’s applications for protection and a stay of removal were arbitrary and unlawful cannot point to a violation of article 3. The State party considers that counsel is effectively asking the Committee to hear an appeal against the Canadian courts’ decisions. 7.2 As to the claim that the State party had “been a party” to the decision of the Minister’s delegate, the State party argues that it too is inadmissible, on grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, insofar as the complainant raised it for the first time before the Committee, whereas he should have raised it first with the Federal Court of Canada. 7.3 The State party argues that counsel’s claims in respect of the pre-removal procedure are inadmissible because they do not demonstrate the minimum justification needed to meet the requirements of article 22 of the Convention. In the alternative, the claims in respect of the pre-removal procedure do not constitute a violation of article 3 of the Convention. The State party points out that the complainant’s claims with regard to the Federal Court’s refusal to grant the parties an interim hearing and his right to be heard by an independent and impartial court were in fact raised in the Federal Court, which found that the time limit for submitting an application for a stay was normal and noted that the complainant had known since 15 May 2006 that his request for protection had been denied and the removal procedure was to be set in motion. The State party argues that the complainant could have prepared his application for a stay well before 12 June 2006. As to the second claim, the presiding judge at the stay hearing 7 In this context counsel cites the European Court of Human Rights decision in Aksoy v. Turkey (100/1995/606/694).