in conformity with the Committee’s jurisprudence,15 the authors consider that they could not be required to apply for habeas corpus. 5.10 The authors made further submissions concerning the merits of the communication. They point out that, in its observations, the State party officially admitted that the authorities knew the death of Thomas Sankara on 15 October 1987 was not due to natural causes. From that they conclude that the appeal lodged on 30 [sic] September 2002 is no longer necessary. They further note that the then Minister of Justice, now the President of Burkina Faso, did not institute proceedings despite being aware that the victim did not die a natural death. Similarly, the Procurator of Faso and the Minister of Defence did not ensure that the Supreme Court’s decision was referred to the military courts. The authors again refer to the statement made by the President of Burkina Faso on Radio France Internationale on 19 June 2001 and consider it to be in breach of article 71 (1) and (3) of the Code of Military Justice, which establishes, among the duties of the Minister of Defence, his exclusive competence to order proceedings in the military courts. The authors stress that whenever a violation has been reported by a civilian examining judge, Procurator of Faso or Procurator-General, the Minister of Defence has ordered proceedings to be brought. According to the authors, who refer to a statement in Le Pays, 16 the Minister of Defence personally refused to exercise the powers conferred on him by article 71 (3) of the Code of Military Justice. They again stress that all the judicial authorities, including the Procurator of Faso and the Procurator-General, have either refused to allow, or wilfully prevented or omitted to initiate, proceedings in the military courts. Decision on admissibility 6.1 At its eightieth session, the Committee examined the admissibility of the communication. 6.2 The Committee noted the State party’s arguments concerning the inadmissibility of the communication ratione temporis. Having also noted the authors’ arguments, the Committee considered that a distinction should be drawn between the 15 Communication No. 30/1978, Bleier v. Uruguay, Views of 29 March 1982. 16 “At this juncture, matters must not be confused. To date, the Minister of Defence has not been called upon to intervene as such in the Thomas Sankara case. I have no judicial document or a document from a claimant calling on me to act. If one day this problem arises, courageously and with the President of Burkina Faso as the supreme chief of the armed forces, we shall ensure that a solution is found to the problem. Thomas Sankara was in fact one of our brothers in arms. There is no reason why any problem raised concerning him cannot be solved.” Le Pays, No. 2,493, 22 October 2001. 126 126 complaint relating to Mr. Thomas Sankara and the complaint concerning Ms. Sankara and her children. The Committee considered that the death of Thomas Sankara, which may have involved violations of several articles of the Covenant, occurred on 15 October 1987, hence before the Covenant and the Optional Protocol entered into force for Burkina Faso. 17 This part of the communication was therefore inadmissible ratione temporis. Thomas Sankara’s death certificate of 17 January 1988, stating that he died of natural causes—contrary to the facts, which are public knowledge and confirmed by the State party (paras. 4.2 and 4.7)—and the authorities’ failure to correct the certificate during the period since that time must be considered in the light of their continuing effect on Ms. Sankara and her children. 6.3 In conformity with its jurisprudence, 18 the Committee was of the view that it could not consider violations which occurred before the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party unless those violations continued after the Protocol’s entry into force. A continuing violation is to be interpreted as an affirmation, after the entry into force of the Optional Protocol, by act or by clear implication, of previous violations by the State party. The Committee took note of the authors’ arguments concerning, first, the failure of the authorities to conduct an inquiry into the death of Thomas Sankara (which was public knowledge) and to prosecute those responsible—allegations which are not in fact challenged by the State party. These constitute violations of their rights and of the obligations of States under the Covenant.19 Secondly, it was clear that in order to remedy this situation, the authors initiated judicial proceedings on 29 September 1997, i.e., within the limits of the 10-year statute of limitations, and these proceedings continued after the Covenant and the Optional Protocol entered into force for Burkina Faso. Contrary to the arguments of the State party, the Committee considered that the proceedings were prolonged, not because of a procedural error on the part of the authors, but because of a conflict of competence between authorities. Consequently, in so far as, according to the information provided by the authors, the alleged violations resulting from the failure to conduct an inquiry and prosecute the guilty parties have affected 17 Communication No. 345/1998, R.A.V.N. et al. v. Argentina, decision of 26 March 1990 on inadmissibility. 18 Communications Nos. 24/1997, S. Lovelace v. Canada, Views of 30 July 1981, 196/1985, I. Gueye v. France, Views of 3 April 1989, 516/1992, J. Simunek et al. v. Czech Republic, Views of 19 July 1995, 520/1992, E. and A.K. v. Hungary, decision of 7 April 1994 on inadmissibility, and 566/1993, Ivan Somers v. Hungary, Views of 23 July 1996. 19 Communication No. 612/1995, Vicente v. Colombia, Views of 29 July 1997.