know the circumstances of his death, 34 and the Committee points out that any complaint relating to acts prohibited under article 7 of the Covenant must be investigated rapidly and impartially by the competent authorities.35 In addition, the Committee notes, as it did during its deliberations on admissibility, the failure to correct Thomas Sankara’s death certificate of 17 January 1988, which records a natural death contrary to the publicly known facts, which have been confirmed by the State party. The Committee considers that the refusal to conduct an investigation into the death of Thomas Sankara, the lack of official recognition of his place of burial and the failure to correct the death certificate constitute inhuman treatment of Ms. Sankara and her sons, in breach of article 7 of the Covenant. 12.3 Concerning the alleged violation of article 9, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence to the effect that the right to security of person guaranteed in article 9, paragraph 1, of the Covenant applies even outside the context of formal deprivation of liberty.36 The interpretation of article 9 does not allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction.37 In the present case, individuals shot and killed Thomas Sankara on 15 October 1987, and, fearing for their safety, his wife and children left Burkina Faso shortly thereafter. However, the arguments put forward by the authors are not sufficient to reveal a violation of article 9, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. 12.4 Concerning the alleged violation of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, while the authors’ request for public inquiry and legal proceedings do not need to be determined by a court or tribunal, the Committee considers however that whenever, as in the present case, a judicial body is entrusted with the task of deciding on the start of such inquiry and proceedings, it must respect the guarantee of equality of all persons before the courts and tribunals as enshrined in article 14, paragraph 1, and the principles of impartiality, fairness and equality of arms implicit in this guarantee.38 34 Communication No. 107/1981, Quinteros v. Uruguay, Views of 21 July 1983, para. 14. 35 General comment No. 20, para. 14. 36 Communications Nos. 195/1985, Delgado Páez v. Colombia, Views of 12 July 1990, para. 5.5, and 711/1996, Carlos Dias v. Angola, Views of 20 March 2000, para. 8.3. 37 Communications Nos. 821/1998, Chongwe v. Zambia, Views of 25 October 2000, para. 5.3, and 468/1991, Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea, Views of 20 October 1993, para. 9.2. 38 Communication No. 1015/2001, Perterer v. Austria, decision of 20 July 2004 on inadmissibility, para. 9.2. 12.5 The Committee notes the authors’ arguments regarding the non-respect of the guarantee of equality by the Supreme Court when it rejected the appeal on the grounds of failure to deposit security of 5,000 CFA francs, and its refusal to take into account Auguste Sankara’s status as a minor. It appears, firstly, that the State party did not contest the claim that, contrary to article 110 of order No. 91-51 of 26 August 1991, the registrar failed to inform counsel of the obligation to deposit the sum of 5,000 CFA francs as security; and secondly, that the Supreme Court ruling stating that the authors provided no evidence in support of an exemption for Auguste Sankara, as a minor, was unwarranted since the authors were unaware that security was required precisely because of the registrar’s failure to inform them of the fact—a key point of which the Court was fully aware. The Committee accordingly considers that the Supreme Court failed to comply with the obligation to respect the guarantee of equality of all persons before the courts and tribunals as enshrined in article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant and the principles of impartiality, fairness and equality of arms implicit in this guarantee. 12.6 The Committee notes that after the Supreme Court adopted decision No. 46 of 19 June 2001, confirming decision No. 14 in which the Appeal Court declared the ordinary courts incompetent, the relevant authorities refused or omitted to refer the case to the Minister of Defence so that proceedings could be instituted in the military courts in accordance with article 71 (1) and (3) of the Code of Military Justice. The Committee also refers to its deliberations on admissibility and the conclusion it reached that the Procurator wrongly halted the proceedings instituted by the authors and in addition failed to respond to their appeal of 25 July 2001. Lastly, the Committee notes that after the ordinary courts were declared incompetent, almost five years passed, but no judicial proceedings were instituted by the Minister of Defence. The State party was unable to explain these delays, and on this point the Committee considers that, contrary to the State party’s arguments, no time bar could invalidate proceedings in a military court, and consequently the failure to refer the matter to the Minister of Defence should be attributed to the Procurator, who alone had the power to do so. The Committee considers that this inaction since 2001, despite the various remedies sought subsequently by the authors, constitutes a violation of the obligation to respect the guarantee of equality of all persons before the courts and tribunals as enshrined in article 14, paragraph 1, and the principles of impartiality, fairness and equality of arms implicit in this guarantee. 12.7 Concerning the alleged violation of article 26 of the Covenant, the Committee considers that the arguments put forward by the authors concerning the 133 133