behalf, that there were circumstances which prevented counsel from receiving such authorization, or that given the close relationship in the past between counsel and the alleged victim it is fair to assume that the victim did indeed authorize counsel to proceed with a communication to the Human Rights Committee.”13 2004 and thus likely to be able to give his consent to the presentation of the a complaint, the legal guardian or the parents have, at any time, consented to the author’s acting on behalf of the child. 6.6 The Committee also notes the author’s argument that consent from the child, his legal guardian or his parents could not be obtained because all are under the influence of the alleged perpetrators of the sexual abuse. Nevertheless, the Committee also notes that after receiving the initial submission, it had asked the author to submit a power of attorney from the mother if she has regained parental authority or, if the child still has a legal guardian, to at least indicate consent to the examination of the case. On 14 January 2005, the author explained that it was unable to provide such a power of attorney or agreement for the reasons already spelt out above. There is no indication that the author has sought to obtain informal consent from the child, with whom it is no longer in contact. 6.4 The Committee recalls that children must generally rely on other persons to present their claims and represent their interests, and may not be of an age or capacity to authorize any steps to be taken on their behalf. A restrictive approach should thus be avoided. Indeed, it has been the constant practice of the Committee to consider that a parent has standing to act on behalf of his or her children without explicit authorization from them.14 While a parent is the most appropriate person to act on behalf of a child, the Committee does not exclude that the counsel of the child in the domestic proceedings may continue to present the child’s claims to the Committee. Nonetheless, the Committee must still examine, as mentioned above, whether counsel has authorization from the child (or his or her immediate family) to act on his or her behalf, whether there are circumstances which prevented counsel from receiving such authorization, or that given the close relationship in the past between counsel and the child it is fair to assume that the child did indeed authorize counsel to proceed with a communication to the Committee. 6.7 In the absence of express authorization, the author should provide evidence that it has a sufficiently close relationship with the child to justify it acting without such authorization. The Committee notes that the author acted as counsel for the child in the domestic proceedings between January and August 2003 with several interruptions. Since the author ceased to represent the child in the domestic proceedings in August 2003, it has not been in contact with him, his legal guardian or his parents. In such circumstances, the Committee cannot even assume that the child does not object, let alone consent, to the author proceeding with a communication to the Committee. Consequently, not withstanding that the Committee is gravely disturbed by the evidence in this case, it is precluded by the provisions of the Optional Protocol from considering the matter since the author has not shown that it may act on the victim’s behalf in submitting this communication. 6.5 In the present case, the Committee must decide whether the author which acted as counsel for the child for part of the domestic proceedings has standing to bring a communication to the Committee on his behalf, regardless of the fact that it has no authorization from the child, his legal guardian or his parents. The Committee notes that the author conceded that it was not authorized to act by the child, his legal guardian or his parents (para.3.5 above). Indeed, the question of instructing the author to submit a communication to the Committee on behalf of the child has not been discussed with the child, his legal guardian or the parents. There is no indication either that the child, who was 12 at the time of the submission of the communication in 7. Accordingly, the Committee decides: (a) That the communication is inadmissible under article 1 of the Optional Protocol; (b) That this decision be transmitted to the State party and to the author. 13 Communication No. 772/1997, Y. v. Australia, Inadmissibility decision adopted on 17 July 2000, para. 6.3. 14 See communication No. 417/1990, Balaguer Santacana v. Spain, Views adopted on 15 July 1994, paras. 6.1 and 9.2; communication No. 901/1009, Laing v. Australia, Inadmissibility decision adopted on 9 July 2004, para. 7.3. 34