no matter how unmeritorious such claims may be, article 2, paragraph 3, provides protection to alleged victims if their claims are sufficiently well founded to be arguable under the Covenant.” (internal footnote omitted) qualify as a normal civil obligation, the labour in question must, at a minimum, not be an exceptional measure; it must not possess a punitive purpose or effect; and it must be provided for by law in order to serve a legitimate purpose under the Covenant. In the light of these considerations, the Committee is of the view that the material before it, including the absence of a degrading or dehumanizing aspect of the specific labour performed, does not show that the labour in question comes within the scope of the proscriptions set out in article 8. It follows that no independent violation of article 8 of the Covenant has been made out. 7.3 Applying this reasoning to the present claim that the State party did not provide an effective remedy for the alleged breach of article 8 of the Covenant, the Committee observes, with reference to its admissibility considerations identified above in the context of exhaustion of domestic remedies, that, in the State party’s legal system, it was and remains impossible for a person such as the author to challenge the substantive elements of the Work for Dole programme, that is, the obligation imposed by law on persons such as the author, who satisfy the preconditions for access to the programme, to perform labour in exchange for receipt of unemployment benefits. The Committee recalls that the State party’s proposed remedies address the question of whether or not an individual in fact satisfies the requirements for access to the programme, but no remedy is available to challenge the substantive scheme for those who are by law subject to it. 8. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation of article 2, paragraph 3, read together with article 8, of the Covenant. 9. While in accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy, the Committee is of the view that in the present case its Views on the merits of the claim constitutes sufficient remedy for the violation found. The State party is under an obligation to ensure that similar violations of the Covenant do not occur in the future. 7.4 As the Committee’s consideration (infra) on the merits of the substantive article 8 shows, the question presented undoubtedly raises an issue, in the language of the Committee’s decision in Kazantzis, that was “sufficiently well founded to be arguable under the Covenant”. It follows, therefore, that the absence of a remedy available to test an arguable claim under article 8 of the Covenant such as the present amounts to a violation of article 2, paragraph 3, read together with article 8, of the Covenant. 10. Bearing in mind that, by becoming a State party to the Optional Protocol, the State party has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of the Covenant or not and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant to provide an effective and enforceable remedy in case a violation has been established, the Committee wishes to receive from the State party, within 90 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to its Views. 7.5 Concerning the principal claim under article 8, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, the Committee observes that the Covenant does not spell out in further detail the meaning of the terms “forced or compulsory labour”. While the definitions of the relevant ILO instruments may be of assistance in elucidating the meaning of the terms, it ultimately falls to the Committee to elaborate the indicia of prohibited conduct. In the Committee’s view, the term “forced or compulsory labour” covers a range of conduct extending from, on the one hand, labour imposed on an individual by way of criminal sanction, notably in particularly coercive, exploitative or otherwise egregious conditions, through, on the other hand, to lesser forms of labour in circumstances where punishment as a comparable sanction is threatened if the labour directed is not performed. The Committee notes, moreover, that article 8, paragraph 3 (c) (iv), of the Covenant exempts from the term “forced or compulsory labour” such work or service forming part of normal civil obligations. In the Committee’s view, to so The State party’s description of the WFD programme The WFD programme was introduced by the 1997 legislation. Its object, according to the statute, is “to reinforce the principle of mutual obligations applying to [unemployment benefits] by recognizing that it is fair and reasonable that persons in receipt of such payments participate in approved programmes of work in return for such payments and to set out the means by which they may be enabled, or required, to undertake such work”. The State party points out that a Work for Dole programme cannot require more than 24 or 30 hours’ work (up to and beyond 21 years of age, respectively) per fortnight, and an individual is 73