2.18 The child was not heard during the trial. However, it transpires from the judgement that through her lawyer, “the position was taken on behalf of the child that she wished to remain with her present foster parents although she still indicated a wish to visit with her mother”. During the trial, the child’s psychologist stated that J. was strongly attached to her mother, that she needed contact with her, and that she would suffer if deprivation of all access continued. 2.22 The author made further motions and appeals which were all rejected on procedural grounds. Finally, on 13 September 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an application for leave to appeal and a motion for stay of adoption filed by the author. Her applications to the Ontario Human Rights Commission, the Ministry of Community and Social Services, and to “many other authorities” were fruitless. The complaint 2.19 With regard to the author’s condition and her conduct, the Court further noted that: 3.1 While the author did not initially invoke violations of specific provisions of the Covenant, she subsequently, in comments on the State party’s observations, invoked violations of articles 1; 2; 3; 5, paragraph 2; 7; 9, paragraphs 1, 3 and 5; 10, paragraphs 1 and 2 (a); 13; 14, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 (d) and (e) and 4; 16; 17; 18, paragraph 4; 23; 24; 25 (c); and 26 of the Covenant. The Committee, upon analysis of the complaint, considers that it raises the following issues under the Covenant. “It is difficult to determine where [the author’s] illness ends and her malicious behaviour begins as they are intertwined. The apprehension of this child took place in the early hours of the morning on August 2nd, 1997 and from then until this matter proceeded to trial in May and June of 2000, there were endless legal proceedings related to this apprehension which delayed the hearing of the initial problem and [the author], with the assistance of seven or eight lawyers, ran off in all directions attacking everyone with motions and appeals from decisions until finally this year an order was made in the Superior Court, directing that [the author] was a vexatious litigant and she was not permitted to institute any new legal proceedings without prior leave of the Court.” 3.2 The author claims, on her own behalf, violations of article 14, in relation to her convictions and imprisonment for the assault and abduction of her daughter, and of article 9 and article 10, in relation to her treatment while serving her sentence. 3.3 The author claims, on her daughter’s and her own behalf, that her daughter was “abducted” and requests that she be returned to her custody or granted access. She claims that her family was “illegally destroyed” as her daughter was apprehended and kept by the CCAS without a legitimate custody order. Her access to her daughter was unlawfully and arbitrarily terminated by the CCAS without any explanations and in spite of a court order guaranteeing access. Her daughter stayed in the temporary care of the CCAS well beyond the maximum statutory one-year limit. 9 No efforts to return the child to the author, or seek a less restrictive solution, were made in the course of the proceedings. These claims raise issues under article 17, article 23 and article 24. Finally, it considered that continued access would only perpetuate the state of limbo the child found herself in, and that there were no special circumstances demonstrated which would justify the continuation of access in these circumstances. On 10 October 2000, the author’s attempted appeal of 26 July 2000 was dismissed, on procedural grounds. 2.20 In November 2000, the author asked the CCAS for the release of information related to J.’s placement for adoption. The CCAS replied that “the Society has no obligation to advise you as to whether your daughter has been placed for adoption”. 3.4 The author denounces on her daughter’s and her own behalf the delays in considering their case, in particular a delay of almost three years between the commencement of the child protection proceedings in August 1997 and the trial in June 2000, thus raising issues under article 14, paragraph 1. 2.21 It transpires from an affidavit of 22 June 2001 sworn by the child’s foster mother, that the author attempted to be in contact with her daughter on several occasions. She called their home in February, August and October 2000 and went to her school twice, in May and June 2001. According to the foster mother, the girl had run away from the author and sought the assistance of a teacher. J. told her foster mother that the author had approached her, but that “she knew not to speak to her”, and that she “continued to be afraid of her mother”. An “Acknowledgement of Adoption Placement” of 9 August 2001 signed by the foster parents indicates their intention to adopt the child. 9 Child and Family Services Act, Section 70.(1) (…) “the court shall not make an order for society wardship under this Part that results in a child being a society ward for a period exceeding, (a) 12 months, if the child is less than 6 years of age on the day the court makes an order for society wardship”. 79