3.5 The author claims that the hearing of the child protection case was unfair. She claims that during the trial which resulted in the judgement of 26 June 2000, the court did not call the main witnesses nor acknowledge the numerous contradictions in the witnesses’ statements. Further, the psychiatric assessment on which the Court based its finding was carried out two years before the trial and included hearsay information which was not evaluated in court. The judge based his decision on a single outdated report, prepared by the psychiatrist on the CCAS’ request, and paid for by the CCAS. This psychiatrist did not testify during the proceedings. These claims also raise issues under article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. 4.4 The State party reserved the right to make submissions with respect to the admissibility and merits of the communication if further information was received. Author’s comments 5.1 On 21 September 2003, the author commented on the State party’s submissions, arguing that her sole intention is to gain the possibility to see her only child. All her efforts and court applications were aimed at reinstating contact with her daughter, who was separated from her against their will. 5.2 In reply to the State party’s contention that her communication reveals no specific violations of Covenant provisions, the author lists the provisions she considers to have been violated by the State party (see para. 1 above). She reiterates her claim that her daughter was illegally removed from her custody, as the interim supervision order of 7 August 1997 expired after three months. When she decided to take her daughter home after the expiry of that order, she was immediately arrested and imprisoned for two months without trial. She contends that the subsequent terminations of access to her daughter were arbitrarily decided by the CCAS, despite a court order granting her access.11 3.6 The author contends on her daughter’s behalf that the court decisions in the case were not taken in the child’s best interest, and that the unfair and prolonged nature of the proceedings caused her mental suffering, thus raising issues under article 7. 3.7 The author does not further substantiate her claims under articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 13, 16, 18, 25 and 26 of the Covenant. State party’s submission on the admissibility and merits of the communication 4.1 On 15 May 2002, the State party commented on the admissibility and merits of the communication. It notes that in her communication, the author describes her experiences with various legal and social institutions of the State party, and contends that the communication should be declared inadmissible for non-substantiation, as the author’s allegations are formulated in an imprecise manner, without specifying which provisions of the Covenant allegedly were violated. The State party argues that in the light of this deficiency, it cannot provide a response to the author’s complaint. 5.3 The author reiterates that her daughter wanted to have contact with her, which was ignored by the judge, and refers to the adoptability assessment and the psychologist’s recommendation that the author should have access to her child. 5.4 Finally the author claims that her daughter suffered severe anxiety and depression symptoms, as a result of her separation from her. Unnecessarily severe measures towards the family caused an irreversible psychological trauma to the child, and put her at risk of developmental disorders. For the author, this constituted cruel and unusual punishment of her child. 4.2 The State party refers to the Committee’s decision in the case of J.J.C. v. Canada10 where the Committee concluded that the author’s complaint was not sufficiently substantiated due to the “sweeping nature” of the allegations made against the Canadian Court system, and found the communication inadmissible. It submits that the present communication suffers from the same inadequacies as those in that particular communication, and that it should likewise be found inadmissible. 5.5 On the issue of standing of the author to represent her daughter, the author has confirmed that she wishes to bring the complaint also on behalf of her daughter. On 19 August 2006, she informed the Committee that her daughter has been adopted, and that she has no more contact with her. As a result of the incidents of 2001 in which she attempted to enter into contact with her, she was taken to court by her daughter’s foster/adoptive parents and arrested. She also indicates that she has not been provided any information as to the date of adoption. 4.3 The State party argues that the author’s allegations reveal no specific violations of any Covenant provisions, and that the communication is without merits. 11 The author refers to the order of 7 August 1997 giving her access and the termination of access on 1 December 1997 further to the abduction, as well as the order of 17 May 1999 reinstating access and the CCAS’ unilateral decision to terminate access in August 1999. 10 Communication No. 367/1989, J.J.C. v. Canada, inadmissibility decision of 5 November 1991. 80