be able to make a personal submission of his version of the facts, and that a defence counsel should not be imposed on him, leaving him free to choose who will defend him. of a third lawyer to an appellant who did not wish to assume his own defence was not in breach of the European Convention. 5.2 With regard to admissibility, the author explains that the claim which he has lodged with the Committee differs from the case heard by the European Court. First of all, the Court only considered the events relating to the judgement of the Court of first instance of 15 December 1998. Since then, he appealed against the judgement and is still awaiting a decision. Moreover, the point of law raised relates to article 14 of the Covenant, not article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights; the tenor of those provisions is different. According to the author, in addition to the breach of the basic guarantee set out in article 14, paragraph 3 (d) and (e), there has also been a violation of paragraphs 1 and 5 of that article, namely, the right to a fair trial in connection with the judgement, on appeal, regarding the civil obligations resulting from an unlawful criminal conviction. 4.5 The State party points out that the right to defend oneself is a right enshrined in Portugal’s penal procedure. Articles 138 and 140 of the Code of Penal Procedure allow the accused to be given a hearing and to express directly and personally his position with regard to the facts, and article 332 of the same Code requires the accused to be present in court. 4.6 In the State party’s view, a distinction should be drawn between personal defence, which allows the accused to be given a hearing and to submit his position with regard to the facts directly, and technical defence, to be conducted by a lawyer, for certain stages of the proceedings such as hearings or appeals. The right to defend oneself is not absolute: in certain circumstances States may require legal representation by a lawyer. 3 Though article 14, paragraph 3 (d), of the Covenant recognizes the right of the accused to defend himself in person or with legal assistance, it does not specify under what conditions and leaves to States parties the choice of the appropriate means to enable their judicial systems to guarantee the defence. 5.3 Lastly, article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol to the Covenant rules out consideration by the Committee of any communication if the same matter is “being examined” under another procedure of international investigation or settlement, not if the matter has already been examined. 4.7 The State party maintains that the requirement for a lawyer to act at certain stages of the proceedings is a sufficient and proportionate means for States to employ in order to provide greater guarantees and more strictly defend the accused, given the type and specific nature of the issues raised in criminal proceedings. 5.4 The author points out that the rule requiring a claim to be lodged within six months of the final decision does not apply to the Committee. As to his status as victim, the amnesty granted by the Court of Ponte de Lima on 3 December 1999 did not expunge his sentence to pay damages to the judge in question and that he can therefore still claim to be a victim. Author’s comments on the State party’s submissions 5.5 So far as the exhaustion of domestic remedies is concerned, the author concedes that he has not exhausted domestic remedies given the application he filed on 18 January 2001. He maintains, however, although without laying a complaint for a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (c), of the Covenant, that he has been waiting for more than four years for a decision from the Appeals Court, and this does not constitute an appeals procedure functioning within a reasonable lapse of time. He also explains that he raised before the Constitutional Court the question of his right to defend himself personally, and that the Constitutional Court’s decision did not take account of the fact that the temporary removal of his name from the Bar Council’s roll was wrongful. 5.1 In his comments of 4 August 2003, the author contests the arguments of the State party. First of all, he considers that Portugal’s Code of Penal Procedure departs from article 14 of the Covenant in stipulating that in certain cases, including attendance at hearings and the lodging of appeals, the presence of a defence lawyer is obligatory, and if the accused fails to appoint a lawyer, the court must assign him one. The author also refers to the case law of the Portuguese Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal de Justiça) under which the accused cannot act in person in criminal proceedings, even if he is a lawyer or a judge. Finally, the author considers that the reference by the State party to the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to the case of Croissant v. Germany, 25 September 1992, is not relevant, as on that occasion the Court decided that the assignment 5.6 On the merits, the author points out that a breach of article 14, paragraph 3 (d), is manifest in Portuguese legislation, whereas other States’ laws 4 allow an accused to defend himself in person. At the judicial level there is also a breach of article 14, 3 The State party refers to Ireneu Cabral Barreto in its comments to the European Court of Human Rights (2nd ed., pp. 168-169) and to the case of Croissant v. Germany, 25 September 1992 (Series A, No. 237-B). 4 100 For example, China, Sweden and Switzerland.