that the Minister of Defence should not have to deal with court cases.5 2.14 On 25 June 2001, a further application was addressed to the Procurator of Faso. 2.15 On 23 July 2001, the Procurator of Faso replied to counsel, stating that their request related to acts categorized as offences committed on 15 October 1987, in other words, over 13 years and 8 months previously, and that, in its decision of 26 January 2000, the Court of Appeal had declared itself incompetent and had instructed the parties to refer the matter to a different court. 2.16 On 25 July 2001, counsel challenged the reply provided by the Procurator of Faso,6 and once again requested that the case should be brought before the military courts, in accordance with article 71 (3) of the Code of Military Justice, since a claimant for criminal indemnification may not lodge an appeal. To date, no reply from the Procurator, and hence no referral to the Minister of Defence, have been reported. The complaint 3.1 The authors consider that the failure to organize a public inquiry and legal proceedings to determine the identity and civil and criminal responsibilities of Thomas Sankara’s assassins, and also the failure to correct his death certificate, constitute a serious denial of justice in terms of their protection as members of the Sankara family, in 5 “It’s all very well to keep harping on one particular aspect of the Sankara case. But it should not be forgotten that there are certainly many cases before the courts. The Minister of Defence is not there to deal with justicerelated issues; he certainly has other concerns. But I can assure you that, in all matters relating to all legal cases, there will be nothing to prevent cases from proceeding from start to finish in our country. We have chosen the rule of law and we intend to meet our responsibilities in this regard.” 6 The authors claim, first, that the statute of limitations was interrupted (neither the judicial examination order nor the Court of Appeal decision challenged the admissibility of the complaint. Similarly, the predecessor of the current Procurator of Faso had not invoked the statute of limitations, but article 34 of the Code of Military Justice. Lastly, the Supreme Court’s decision on inadmissibility applies only to the non-payment of security and not to the statute of limitations). Secondly, the authors claim that the Court of Appeal decision instructed the parties, not only the claimant but also the prosecuting authorities, to take proceedings in another court. In accordance with this decision, the authors explain that they were unable, under the provisions of the Code of Military Justice, to bring the case directly before the Minister of Defence (who is the only person with authority to issue the prosecution order in connection with an offence within the jurisdiction of the military courts), and were thus obliged to refer the case to the Procurator in accordance with article 71 (3) of the Code of Military Justice. Once again, reference is made to the Public Prosecutor v. Kafando Marcel et al. case. 122 122 breach of articles 17 and 23, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. They consider, moreover, that the failure to conduct an inquiry, and hence the failure to uphold guarantees relating to equality before the law, and also the Procurator’s refusal to refer the case to the Minister of Defence, thus preventing their complaint from being resolved, are attributable to their political opinions, in breach of articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 of the Covenant. 3.2 The authors maintain that the State party has failed to comply with its obligations (a) to provide them with an effective remedy for the violations they suffered, in accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), of the Covenant, and (b) to guarantee the impartiality of justice as required under article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. In this regard, the authors explain that the purpose of the decision taken by the court of first instance to declare the military courts competent and to require an abnormally high bond (1 million CFA francs) was to obstruct the examination of their complaint and, consequently, constituted a violation of the “equality of arms” principle. Similarly, the fact that their counsel were obliged to make a formal request to the Court of Appeal to issue a decision falls into the above category of violations. The authors consider that this also applied to the procedure before the Supreme Court, in particular because the President of the Supreme Court is a supporter of both the ruling party and the serving President, and because the decision to rule the appeal inadmissible on the grounds that no bond had been paid was in fact a pretext for not ruling on the merits of the case. 3.3 The authors consider that, as a minor, Auguste Sankara should have been exempted from deposit of a bond under the legislation in force. However, by its decision of 19 June 2001, the Supreme Court refused to recognize him as a minor, in breach of article 16 of the Covenant. 3.4 Lastly, the authors maintain that the authorities’ refusal to correct Thomas Sankara’s death certificate constitutes a continuing violation of article 6, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. Observations of the State party on the admissibility of the communication 4.1 In its observations of 1 April 2003, the State party contests the admissibility of the communication. 4.2 The State party conducts what it terms a historical review, focusing primarily on the conditions under which Captain Thomas Sankara came to power on 4 August 1983 and the consequences of this development in terms of human rights violations. The State party describes what it calls a process of democratization and national