them since the entry into force of the Covenant and the Optional Protocol because the proceedings have not concluded to date, the Committee considered that this part of the communication was admissible ratione temporis. additional remedy introduced by the authors in connection with the complaint of 30 September 2002 against a person or persons unknown had been exhausted at the time the communication was examined. 6.4 As to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, and the State party’s argument of inadmissibility based on failure to make use of non-contentious remedies, 20 the Committee recalled that domestic remedies must be not only available but also effective, and that the term “domestic remedies” must be understood as referring primarily to judicial remedies. The effectiveness of a remedy also depended, to a certain extent, on the nature of the alleged violation.21 In the present case, the alleged violation concerned the right to life, and was linked primarily to the alleged failure to conduct an inquiry and to initiate proceedings against the guilty parties, and secondarily to the alleged failure to correct the victim’s death certificate, as well as to the failure of the appeals initiated by the authors in order to remedy the situation. In these circumstances, the Committee considered that the non-contentious remedies mentioned by the State party in its submission could not be considered effective for the purposes of article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol.22 6.7 As to the State party’s claim concerning prescription resulting from the tardy and procedurally incorrect referral of the case to the courts, the Committee considered it unfounded as set out above (cf. para. 6.3). Moreover, the Committee cannot accept this argument in support of the State party’s assertion that the Procurator could not be blamed for having refused to refer the case to the Minister of Defence. In this connection, the Committee found that the grounds for refusal adduced by the Procurator on 23 July 2001 were manifestly unfounded since (a) as set forth above, that statute of limitations could not be applied (and had not in fact been applied by the various authorities throughout the proceedings), and (b) the authors could not themselves bring the case before the military courts (the only competent jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal’s decision No. 14 having become final following decision No. 46 of the Supreme Court). Only the Minister of Defence, after referral by the Procurator, could issue the order to initiate proceedings, failing which it would be invalid. Hence the Procurator wrongly halted the proceedings initiated by the authors and, furthermore, did not respond to their appeal of 25 July 2001, a fact which has not been commented on by the State party. 6.5 With regard to the State party’s claims relating to the non-use of certain contentious remedies concerning the denial of justice, the Committee noted that the State party had confined itself to a mere recital of remedies available under Burkina Faso law, without providing any information on the relevance of those remedies in the specific circumstances of the case or demonstrating that they would have constituted effective and available remedies. With particular regard to the application for disqualification of the President of the Supreme Court, the Committee considered that the authors could not know the Court’s decision in advance, and that it would be for the Committee to determine, in the examination of the merits, whether the President’s decision had been arbitrary or constituted a denial of justice. 6.6 On the question of the claim of inadmissibility on the ground that the authors had lodged a complaint with the Committee when proceedings were pending before the national courts, the Committee could not accept this argument in that the 20 Médiateur du Faso, Collège des sages, National Reconciliation Commission, and Compensation Fund for Victims of Political Violence. 21 Communication No. 612/1995, Vicente v. Colombia, Views of 29 July 1997. 22 Communications Nos. 612/1995, Vicente v. Colombia, Views of 29 July 1997, and 778/1997, Coronel et al. v. Colombia, Views of 24 October 2002. 127 127 6.8 Lastly, the Committee considered that the authors exhausted domestic remedies in conformity with article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol. 6.9 As to the State party’s argument about the allegedly political character of the complaint, the Committee considered that this in no way affected the admissibility of the communication and, in fact, fell within the scope of the examination of the communication on the merits. 6.10 Regarding the complaints of violations of articles 17 and 23 of the Covenant, the Committee considered that the authors’ allegations concerning the consequences, where their protection in particular was concerned, of the failure to conduct an inquiry into the death of Thomas Sankara and to identify those responsible did not fall within the scope of the articles mentioned, but did raise issues