establishes that “privacy” includes attacks on dignity2 and covers an individual’s interactions with other persons, 3 including consensual and nonconsensual sexual activity. 4 It considers that the treatment suffered by the victim constitutes an arbitrary and unlawful interference with his privacy. submits that no alternative legal representation exists for the victim in this case, since neither the parents, nor the guardian were willing to initiate a private prosecution. It recalls that it was the child’s former legal counsel in the domestic proceedings. As to the object and scope of the application, it notes that the present communication is confined to complaints that the domestic criminal investigation did not comply with standards enshrined in the Covenant. Finally, there are no possible conflicts of interest between the author and the victim in the pursuit of this communication since it addresses matters in which the author was duly authorized to represent the victim at the domestic level. 3.3 The author alleges a violation of article 24, paragraph 1, taken alone and read in conjunction with article 2, paragraphs 1 and 3. It argues that States parties are required to adopt such measures of protection as are required by each child’s status as a minor. The best interest of the child is the foremost consideration in assessing and addressing the needs of children. The author submits that through its acts and omissions the State party violated article 24, paragraph 1, because the national authorities were clearly not guided by the best interest of the child in making the decisions that affected him. 3.6 The author claims that all effective and adequate domestic remedies have been exhausted and that the State party failed to provide the victim with a legal or any other remedy for the violations he suffered. The HLC alleges that the authorities had sufficient information about the abuse to investigate and prosecute the offenders, but failed to do so. Local and prosecutorial authorities showed no willingness to investigate the case properly, and witnesses were threatened by the alleged perpetrators, with impunity. The Centre for Social Work in A granted and withdrew the power of attorney from the author several times in the span of three months, thereby sabotaging the author’s efforts to move the prosecution forward, while the investigating judge granted the author’s request to broaden the investigation only after the appeal (having rejected it twice before) and cancelled the investigation on three occasions before the final cancellation in November 2003. 3.4 The author submits that the victim’s abuse occurred against a backdrop of widespread discrimination against members of the Roma community. This factor contributed to the very occurrence of the abuse and the public manner in which it was played out. 3.5 With regard to the lack of express authorization to represent the victim, the author recalls the Committee allows a communication to be submitted on behalf of an alleged victim when the victim is unable to submit the communication personally, especially in cases concerning children. In its jurisprudence, the Committee had been guided not solely by the rules of domestic procedure in matters of standing and representation, but also by “the best interests of the child.” 5 The author also refers to the test applied by the European Commission of Human Rights. When deciding over the standing of a solicitor who had represented minor children in domestic custody proceedings, the Commission examined (1) whether other or more appropriate representation existed or was available; (2) the nature of the links between the author and the child; (3) the object and scope of the application introduced on the victim’s behalf; and (4) whether there were any conflicts of interest. 6 The author 3.7 The author requests the Committee to urge the State party to reopen the criminal investigation, to interview witnesses in a confidential manner, to protect such witnesses, to punish those responsible for abusing the victim and to provide appropriate psychological support to him. It also requests that adequate compensation be paid to the victim. State party’s submissions on admissibility and merits 4.1 By note verbale of 8 August 2005, the State party challenged the admissibility of the communication on the ground that the author has no standing before the Committee and that the communication is insufficiently substantiated. It argues that the author’s submission does not make clear whether a violation of article 2 of the Covenant taken alone or read in conjunction with articles 7, 17, and 24, is also alleged. 2 See communication No.721/1996, Boodoo v. Trinidad and Tobago, Views adopted on 2 April 2002, para. 6.7. 3 See communication No. 453/1991, Coeriel and Aurik v. The Netherlands, Views adopted on 31 October 1994, para. 10.2. 4 See communication No. 488/1992, Toonen v. Australia, Views adopted on 31 March 1994, para. 8.2. 5 See communication No. 417/1990, Balaguer Santacana v. Spain, Views adopted on 15 July 1994, paras. 6.1 and 9.2; and communication No. 901/1009, Laing v. Australia, Inadmissibility decision adopted on 9 July 2004, para. 7.3. 6 See S.P., D.P. and A.T. v. United Kingdom, Admissibility decision, application No. 23715/94 (20 May 1996). See also P., C. and S. v. United Kingdom, application No. 56547/00, Admissibility decision (11 December 2001); and C. and D. v. United Kingdom and S. and others v. United Kingdom, applications Nos. 34407/02 and 34593/02, Inadmissibility decision (31 August 2004). 31