4.5 In addition, the author failed first to approach the ‘liable person’ or, as applicable, seize the ordinary courts with his restitution request (see Section 4 and 5 of Act No. 87/1991). Since the Constitutional Court cannot substitute these authorities’ activities in their decision-making powers in restitution claims, it had to dismiss this part of the author’s application in accordance with section 43, subsection 1 (e).6 For the same reason, it dismissed the author’s petition for an amendment to Act No. 87/1991, as only Parliament has the power to do so. For these reasons, the author failed to exhaust domestic remedies and the communication is inadmissible in accordance with articles 2 and 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol. his communication to the Committee on 16 January 2006, while the latest domestic decision in the matter is the Constitutional Court’s decision of 4 March 1996. The author does not explain the ten-year delay, and thus the communication is inadmissible for abuse of the right of petition, within the meaning of article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 4.8 On the merits, the State party argues that the communication contains nothing which would indicate any prohibited discrimination against the author. The author has not documented any decision by the national authorities dismissing his restitution claims, which would be at variance with the requirements of article 26, nor is the State party aware of any such decision. According to the information provided, only two decisions were made in this case, namely the Constitutional Court decisions of 29 November 1995 and 4 March 1996. These decisions do not carry any suspicion of prohibited discrimination. Should the author wish to object that Czech restitution legislation requires, inter alia, as a precondition for a valid restitution claim, citizenship of the State party, the State party does not contest this fact. However, the existence per se of this precondition does not constitute prohibited discrimination against the author. Prohibited discrimination against the author could only occur where the national authorities adopted a decision rejecting his restitution claim on the ground of his failure to meet this precondition. 8 Here, no such decision has been adopted. The Constitutional Court dismissed the author’s applications solely on the basis of procedural reasons, not on the basis of applying the precondition of citizenship. Therefore, there has been no violation of article 26 of the Covenant. 4.6 Secondly, the State party argues that the author failed to substantiate his claims related to the discriminatory treatment in the decision-making on his restitution claim. He only lists the property items the surrender of which he seeks. However, under Section 5 of Act No. 87/1991, he should support his restitution titles, document his claim to the surrender of the property or the way in which it was taken by the State, and, in the case of movables, he should indicate the place where these items are located. His communication is therefore inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 4.7 Thirdly, the State party considers that the communication is inadmissible on the ground of abuse of the right of submission (article 3 of the Optional Protocol). While the Optional Protocol does not set fixed time limits for submitting a communication, and a mere delay in submission does not itself involve abuse of the right of submission, the State party recalls the jurisprudence of the Committee which expects a reasonable and objectively understandable explanation to such a time lapse.7 In the present case, the author submitted Author’s comments 5. On 28 February 2007, and in relation to the State party’s claims that he failed to provide documentary evidence on his properties, the author refers to his initial communication and the list of confiscated properties which he provided. The author invokes the Simunek decision9 in support of his claim that the citizenship issue is discriminatory and incompatible with the requirements of article 26. As to the argument that he did not exhaust domestic remedies, he argues that even if he had been renaturalized as a Czech citizen,10 he would breach the on the latest remedy provided by the law for the protection of his rights”. It appears that the part of the complaint requesting a review of the constitutionality of Act No. 87/1991 were dismissed as proceedings on this matter where already under way (Pl. ŪS 3/94): “the admission of the petition was prevented by the obstacle of litispendence, i.e., a case instigated under Section 35, subsection 2 of the Act on the Constitutional Court […] it was not possible to accord to the appellant the status of an enjoined party, because in the light of the defects in his petition he could not be regarded as an eligible petitioner”. 6 “Decisions on indemnification and restitution are made by the authorities named in Act No. 87/1991 rather than the Constitutional Court, which is called to review the constitutionality of their decision-making” (see translation provided by the State party). 7 The State party refers to communication No. 787/1997, Gobin v. Mauritius, Inadmissibility decision of 16 July 2001, which the Committee declared inadmissible as the communication had been submitted five years after the alleged violation of the Covenant, holding that the author did not provide “convincing explanation” to justify the delay (para. 6.3). 8 The State party refers to communication No. 516/1992, Simunek et al v. Czech Republic, Views adopted on 19 July 1995. 9 Communication No. 516/1992, Simunek et al v. Czech Republic, Views adopted on 19 July 1995. 10 The author claims he never lost Czech citizenship in light of the law of ius sanguinis. 49