before the Committee.12 The bond existing between a mother and her child and the allegations in the case should be considered sufficient to justify representation of the author’s daughter by her mother. In addition, the Committee also notes that the author has repeatedly but unsuccessfully sought to obtain authorization from her daughter to act on her behalf (see para. 5.6 above). In the circumstances, the Committee is not precluded from examining the claims made on behalf of the child by her mother. 5.6 On 31 October 2006, the author indicated that her attempts to contact her daughter were prevented by the present caregivers, and that she has not been able to obtain an authorization from her daughter to act on her behalf in the proceedings before the Committee. Consequently she took the matter to court, in which the proceedings are still pending. On 22 February 2007, she confirmed that a court hearing initially scheduled for December 2006 had been postponed to 9 March 2007. Absence of further comments from the State party 7.5 The Committee understands the author’s claims under article 9, article 10 and article 14, paragraph 2, as relating to her convictions for assault of her daughter and for child abduction, and the imprisonment related thereto. It notes that she has not provided any evidence supporting these claims, nor any description of facts sufficiently substantiated for purposes of admissibility, and accordingly finds them inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 6. On 10 December 2003, the author’s comments were transmitted to the State party, which did not provide any further comments. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 7.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 93 of its rules of procedure, decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 7.6 The Committee considers that the author’s claim that her daughter was a victim of mental suffering in violation of article 7 is not sufficiently substantiated for purposes of admissibility, and finds this claim inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 7.2 The Committee has ascertained that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement for purposes of article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol. It notes that the State party has not contested the admissibility of the communication on grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, and that the author’s application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was denied on 13 September 2001. It thus considers that the author has exhausted domestic remedies. 7.7 The Committee considers that the remaining claims raise issues under the Covenant and are sufficiently substantiated, for purposes of admissibility, and declares the communication admissible with respect to the claims under article 14, paragraph 1; article 17; article 23; and article 24 of the Covenant. 7.3 The Committee has noted the State party’s contention that the communication should be declared inadmissible for non-substantiation because the author’s allegations were formulated in an imprecise and sweeping manner, without referring to the Covenant. It observes, however, that in response to State party’s comments, the author, who is unrepresented, made an effort to organize her claims and referred to different articles of the Covenant, although in a broad manner. The State party has not commented on these claims, although it has been given the opportunity to do so. The Committee concludes that the author’s claims are not inadmissible on this ground. Consideration of the merits 8.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided in article 5, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol. 8.2 As to the alleged violation of article 17, the Committee recalls that the term “family” must be understood broadly, and that it refers not solely to the family home during marriage or cohabitation, but also to the relations in general between parents and a child. 13 Where there are biological ties, there is a strong presumption that a “family” exists and only in exceptional circumstances will such relationship not be protected by article 17. The Committee notes that the author and her daughter lived together until the 7.4 With respect to the author’s standing to represent her daughter in relation to her claims under article 7, article 14, article 17, article 23 and article 24, the Committee notes that the author’s daughter is now fourteen years old and has been adopted. It further notes that the author has not provided an authorization from her daughter to act on her behalf. It recalls, however, that a non-custodial parent has sufficient standing to represent his or her children 12 See communication No. 417/1990, Santacana v. Spain, Views adopted on 15 July 1994, para. 6.1. 13 See communication No. 201/1985, Hendriks v. The Netherlands, Views adopted on 27 July 1988, para. 10.3, and communication No. 417/1990, Santacana v. Spain, Views adopted on 15 July 1994, para. 10.2. 81