parents. The Committee does not consider that the slapping incident, the author’s lack of cooperation with the CCAS and the contested fact of her mental disability constituted exceptional circumstances which would justify total severance of contact between the author and her child. It finds that the process by which the State party’s legal system reached a conclusion to completely deny the author access to her daughter, without considering a less intrusive and less restrictive option, amounted to a failure to protect the family unit, in violation of article 23 of the Covenant. In addition, these facts result in a violation of article 24 with respect to the author’s daughter, who was entitled to additional protection as a minor. 8.11 It further transpires from the file that the author changed lawyers various times and filed numerous court motions, which delayed the proceedings. She was also found to be a vexatious litigant who, by her numerous motions and appeals, was sabotaging the timetable of the trial. However, these were all motions aimed at reinstating access of the author to her child. The Committee considers that bringing a motion for access should not have as a necessary consequence the delaying of the main trial. In addition, the delay cannot be attributable only to the author. The Committee for example notes that it was on the CCAS’ request that the PGT was appointed as the author’s representative and that a consequence of this appointment was the postponement of the trial. The Committee finds that in view of the young age of the child, the delay of nearly three years between the placement of the child in CCAS’ care and the trial on the child protection application, which cannot solely be imputed to the author, was undue and in violation of the author’s and her daughter’s rights to an expeditious trial, as guaranteed by article 14, paragraph 1. 8.9 With respect to the claim of undue delay under article 14, paragraph 1, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence that the right to a fair trial guaranteed by this provision includes the expeditious rendering of justice, without undue delay,17 and that the very nature of custody proceedings or proceedings concerning access of a divorced parent to his or her children requires that the issues complained of be adjudicated expeditiously. 18 The Committee considers that this jurisprudence also applies to child protection proceedings, which relate to the removal of parental authority and access of a parent to his or her child. In examining this issue, the Committee must take into consideration the age of the child in question and the consequences that delayed proceedings may have on the child’s wellbeing and the outcome of the court case. 8.12 As to the claims of unfair hearing under article 14, paragraph 1, the Committee observes that the judge based his finding on what he believed to be the “serious illness of the mother”. This conclusion was based on the two-year-old assessment of Dr. K. that the author suffered “from a delusional disorder” and “erotomanic, persecutory and somatic delusions”, and other psychiatric reports. It transpires from the judgement that the judge selectively and incorrectly used these reports. In particular, he appears to have misinterpreted Dr. K.’s assessment (see paras. 2.5 and 2.6 above) that if she did experience erotomanic delusions, they did not appear to have had an impact on her ability to care for her daughter. Further, the judge omitted Dr. G.’s opinion that there was no formal thought disorder, and that her ideas of persecution were not of delusional proportions. The judge did not hear Dr. K., who had been summoned to court by the author but failed to appear, nor did he solicit the testimony any of the other doctors who had assessed the author. 8.10 In the present case, the child was four years old at the time of apprehension in August 1997, and seven years old at the time of the child protection trial in June 2000. As a consequence of the delayed proceedings, the child’s psychologist warned that she was at risk of depression and of developing attachment disorder19 and that she found herself in a “state of limbo,” 20 as she did not know where she belonged. Moreover, the judge partly based his finding on the fact that the child had formed very strong bonds with her foster parents, who wanted to adopt her, and that she wished to remain with them. The Committee notes that the child initially wanted to return to her mother’s care, and that her wish only changed over time. 8.13 It transpires from the file that the judge decided the question of removal on one single incident of assault and contested facts, which took place three years earlier. In addition, there is no indication that the judge considered hearing the child, or that the child was involved at any point in the proceedings. While her wishes were expressed by her lawyer at trial, indicating that “she wished to remain with her present foster parents although she still indicated a wish to visit with her mother”, the judge found that “continued access would only keep this state of limbo which Dr. P. believes is very 17 See communication No. 203/1986, Muñoz Hermoza v. Peru, Views adopted on 4 November 1988, para. 11.3; and communication No.263/1987, González del Río v. Peru, Views adopted on 28 October 1992, para. 5.2. 18 In a different context, see communication No. 514/1992, Fei v. Colombia, Views adopted on 4 April 1995, para. 8.4; and communication No. 417/1990, Santacana v. Spain, Views adopted on 15 July 1994, para. 6.2. 19 P. psychological report of 12 December 1998. 20 P. psychological report of 12 December 1998, 25 October 1999 and testimony at trial. 83