CCPR/C/115/D/2005/2010 Australia, by which the author was returned to Australia to serve the remainder of his sentence. The author states that his imprisonment constituted unlawful and arbitrary detention as it flowed directly from his unfair trial. As that transfer was the result of an agreement between Australia and the United States, the Committee considers that the claim raises issues under article 9 of the Covenant and that it has been sufficiently substantiated for purposes of admissibility. It therefore declares it admissible. 2.11 Regarding the imposition of a control order by the Federal Magistrates Court under article 104 of the Australian Criminal Code, the author claims that the procedure was unfair, in violation of article 14 of the Covenant. The Committee notes the author’s claim that he was not given a genuine opportunity to submit evidence, as doing so might have been viewed as violating the plea agreement. However, from the information contained in the file, the Committee notes, inter alia, that the Federal Magistrate invited the author to present evidence on his own behalf and gave him additional time to submit it, but the author declined to do so; that the Magistrate subjected the evidence of the Australian Federal Police to scrutiny, expressed some concerns, reduced the requirement to report to the authorities and then provided a reasoned explanation for his decision based on the evidence at his disposal; and that the author did not appeal the judgement confirming the control order. 2.12 The Committee takes the view that the author’s claims relate essentially to the evaluation of the facts and evidence carried out by the Australian courts. The Committee is not a final instance competent to re-evaluate findings of fact or the application of domestic legislation, unless it can be ascertained that the proceedings before the domestic courts were arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. In the present case, the Committee considers that the author has failed to substantiate, for purposes of admissibility, that the conduct of the domestic court amounted to arbitrariness or a denial of justice. Accordingly, those claims are inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 2.13 The Committee notes the author’s claims under articles 12, 17, 19 and 22 to the effect that the control order imposed restrictions on the exercise of his freedoms. The Committee considers, however, that the author has failed to substantiate his claims sufficiently for purposes of admissibility. The claims are therefore inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 3. In the light of the foregoing, the Committee declares the communication admissible with respect to the claims mentioned in paragraphs 2.7, 2.9 and 2.10 above, and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 4.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided for under article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. a. State party’s alleged responsibility in connection with the period when the author was in the custody of the United States 4.2 The Committee decided, at the admissibility stage, that the question of the State party’s jurisdiction was closely linked to the merits of the case and should be reviewed at that stage. The Committee is therefore to ascertain whether the State party, at any point, exercised power or effective control over the author and thus whether the author was under its jurisdiction. 4.3 The Committee notes the author’s allegations that: (a) the State party negotiated directly with the United States concerning the trial standard that would apply to the author (see annex II below, para. 15); (b) the State party made various representations to the 6