assurances regarding the death penalty in the same fashion as is found in article 6 of the Extradition Treaty between Canada and the United States. It concludes that interference with the surrender of a fugitive pursuant to legitimate requests from a treaty partner would defeat the principles and objects of extradition treaties and would entail undesirable consequences for States refusing these legitimate requests. In this context, the State party points out that its long, unprotected border with the United States would make it an attractive haven for fugitives from United States justice. If these fugitives could not be extradited because of the theoretical possibility of the death penalty, they would be effectively irremovable and would have to be allowed to remain in the country, unpunished and posing a threat to the safety and security of the inhabitants. that article 1 of the Covenant was "clearly intended to apply to individuals subject to the jurisdiction of the State party concerned at the time of the alleged violation of the Covenant" (emphasis added). 5.3 Counsel finally stresses that the author does not claim a right not to be extradited; he only claims that he should not have been surrendered without assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed. He submits that the communication is therefore compatible with the provisions of the Covenant. He refers in this context to the Committee's Views on communication No. 107/1981,7 where the Committee found that anguish and stress can give rise to a breach of the Covenant; he submits that this finding is also applicable in the instant case. The Committee's consideration of and decision on admissibility 4.6 The State party finally submits that the author has failed to substantiate his allegations that the treatment he may face in the United States will violate his rights under the Covenant. In this connection, the State party points out that the imposition of the death penalty is not per se unlawful under the Covenant. As regards the delay between the imposition and the execution of the death sentence, the State party submits that it is difficult to see how a period of detention during which a convicted prisoner would pursue all avenues of appeal, can be held to constitute a violation of the Covenant. 6.1 During its forty-sixth session, in October 1992, the Committee considered the admissibility of the communication. It observed that extradition as such is outside the scope of application of the Covenant,8 but that a State party's obligations in relation to a matter itself outside the scope of the Covenant may still be engaged by reference to other provisions of the Covenant.9 The Committee noted that the author does not claim that extradition as such violates the Covenant, but rather that the particular circumstances related to the effects of his extradition would raise issues under specific provisions of the Covenant. Accordingly, the Committee found that the communication was thus not excluded ratione materiae. 5.1 In his comments on the State party's submission, counsel submits that the author is and was himself actually and personally affected by the decision of the State party to extradite him and that the communication is therefore admissible ratione personae. In this context, he refers to the Committee's Views in communication No. 35/1978,5 and argues that an individual can claim to be a victim within the meaning of the Optional Protocol if the laws, practices, actions or decisions of a State party raise a real risk of violation of rights set forth in the Covenant. 6.2 The Committee considered the contention of the State party that the claim is inadmissible ratione loci. Article 2 of the Covenant requires States parties to guarantee the rights of persons within their jurisdiction. If a person is lawfully expelled or extradited, the State party concerned will not generally have responsibility under the Covenant for any violations of that person's rights that may 5.2 Counsel further argues that, since the decision complained of is one made by Canadian authorities while the author was subject to Canadian jurisdiction, the communication is admissible ratione loci. In this connection, he refers to the Committee's Views in communication No. 110/1981,6 where it was held 7 Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtyeighth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/38/40), annex XXII, Almeida de Quinteros v. Uruguay, Views adopted on 21 July 1983, para. 14. 8 Ibid., Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/39/40), annex IV, communication No. 117/1981 (M. A. v. Italy), decision adopted on 10 April 1984, para. 13.4. 5 Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtysixth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/36/40), annex XIII, S. Aumeeruddy-Cziffra et al. v. Mauritius, Views adopted on 9 April 1981, para. 9.2. 9 Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtysixth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/36/40), annex XIII, communication No. 35/1978 (Aumeeruddy-Cziffra et al. v. Mauritius), Views adopted on 9 April 1981; and ibid., Forty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/45/40), annex IX.K, communication No. 291/1988 (Torres v. Finland), Views adopted on 2 April 1990. 6 Ibid., Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/39/40), annex XI, Antonio Viana Acosta v. Uruguay, Views adopted on 29 March 1984, para. 6. 96