before the Minister of Justice or before the Committee which would suggest that the United States was acting contrary to the stringent criteria established by article 6 when it sought his extradition from Canada ... The Government of Canada, in the person of the Minister of Justice, was satisfied at the time the order of surrender was issued that if Kindler is executed in the State of Pennsylvania, this will be within the conditions expressly prescribed by article 6 of the Covenant. The Government of Canada remains satisfied that this is so." It would be unreasonable because the principles of interpretation which recognize that human rights instruments are living documents and that human rights evolve over time cannot be employed in the face of express limits to the application of a given document. The absence of extradition from the articles of the Covenant when read with the intention of the drafters must be taken as an express limitation." 9.3 As to the merits, the State party stresses that Mr. Kindler enjoyed a full hearing on all matters concerning his extradition to face the death penalty. "If it can be said that the Covenant applies to extradition at all ... an extraditing State could be said to be in violation of the Covenant only where it returned a fugitive to certain or foreseeable treatment or punishment, or to judicial procedures which in themselves would be a violation of the Covenant." In the present case, the State party submits that whereas it was reasonably foreseeable that Mr. Kindler would be held in the State of Pennsylvania subject to a sentence of death, it was not reasonably foreseeable that he would in fact be put to death or be held in conditions of incarceration that would violate rights under the Covenant. The State party points out that Mr. Kindler is entitled to many avenues of appeal in the United States and that he can petition for clemency; furthermore, he is entitled to challenge in the courts of the United States the conditions under which he is held while his appeals with respect to the death penalty are outstanding. 9.5 Finally, the State party observes that it is "in a difficult position attempting to defend the criminal justice system of the United States before the Committee. It contends that the Optional Protocol process was never intended to place a State in the position of having to defend the laws or practices of another State before the Committee." 9.6 With respect to the issue whether the death penalty violates article 7 of the Covenant, the State party submits that "article 7 cannot be read or interpreted without reference to article 6. The Covenant must be read as a whole and its articles as being in harmony ... It may be that certain forms of execution are contrary to article 7. Torturing a person to death would seem to fall into this category as torture is a violation of article 7. Other forms of execution may be in violation of the Covenant because they are cruel, inhuman or degrading. However, as the death penalty is permitted within the narrow parameters set by article 6, it must be that some methods of execution exist which would not violate article 7." 9.4 As to the imposition of the death penalty in the United States, the State party recalls that article 6 of the Covenant did not abolish capital punishment under international law. "In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, the sentence of death may still be imposed for the most serious crimes in accordance with law in force at the time of the commission of the crime, not contrary to the provisions of the Covenant and not contrary to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The death penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court. It may be that Canada would be in violation of the Covenant if it extradited a person to face the possible imposition of the death penalty where it was reasonably foreseeable that the requesting State would impose the death penalty under circumstances which would violate article 6. That is, it may be that an extraditing State would be violating the Covenant to return a fugitive to a State which imposed the death penalty for other than the most serious crimes, or for actions which are not contrary to a law in force at the time of commission, or which carried out the death penalty in the absence of or contrary to the final judgment of a competent court. Such are not the facts here ... Kindler did not place any evidence before the Canadian courts, 9.7 As to the methods of execution, the State party indicates that the method of execution in Pennsylvania is lethal injection, which is the method proposed by those who advocate euthanasia for terminally ill patients. It is thus at the end of the spectrum of methods designed to cause the least pain. 9.8 As to the "death row phenomenon" the State party submits that each case must be examined on its facts, including the conditions in the prison in which the prisoner would be held while on "death row", the age and the mental and physical condition of the prisoner subject to those conditions, the reasonably foreseeable length of time the prisoner would be subject to those conditions, the reasons underlying the length of time and the avenues, if any, for remedying unacceptable conditions. "Mr. Kindler argued before the Minister of Justice and in Canadian courts that conditions on 'death row' in the State of Pennsylvania would amount to a denial of his rights. His evidence consisted of some testimony and academic journal articles on the effect that electrocution, as a method of execution, was alleged to have on the psychological state of prisoners held 118