affected the jury's decision when it convicted Mr. Kindler were involved. The Canadian authorities should, therefore, have made an assessment of the proceedings at the trial in the United States. (a) Whether the author still has the possibility of appealing against the sentence of first instance, in which he was sentenced to death; (b) In the event of his still having that possibility, whether – if he was found guilty of the first degree murder of which he was convicted – the court of second instance must comply with the decision reached by the jury of first instance or whether it can impose another sentence more beneficial for the protection of the life of the author of the communication; 13. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with the Committee in its assessment of what those "exceptional circumstances" are. In the first place, the Government of Canada has not explained what they consist of; it only mentions that "evidence showing that a fugitive would face certain or foreseeable violations of the Covenant"o would constitute an example of exceptional circumstances. It can be seen how the State party itself agrees that exceptional circumstances have a connection with the consequences of the extradition. Accordingly, the erroneous perception which the majority of the members of the Committee have had has led it to believe that the exceptional circumstances refer to the trial and conviction of Mr. Kindler in Pennsylvania. Thus the majority states that "all the evidence submitted concerning Mr. Kindler's trial and conviction" had been reviewed p when it is certain that the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada has indicated that the judge who deals with the extradition may not weigh the evidence or give an opinion as to its credibility and that such functions are left to the jury or judge in the trial that determines whether an offence has been committed.q (c) The fact that the prevailing trend in the United States of America is to bar appeals in cases involving the death sentence. The intention not to accept appeals in such cases has already been stated, at least in the case of the Supreme Court of Justice; (d) The fact that, according to the available documentation, the imposition of the death sentence might become increasingly frequent in the State of Pennsylvania. Thus, whereas in the author's pleas before the Supreme Court of Canada in May 1990 it is stated that the death penalty has not been applied in that State for a long time – although a large number of persons are awaiting execution by electric chair – the State party, in defending the extradition before the Committee, indicates that "the method of execution in Pennsylvania is lethal injection, which is the method proposed by those who advocate euthanasia ...".l Such an affirmation, which is, moreover, unacceptable in so far as it appears to be a defence of the death penalty by a State which has abolished it for all offences except a few of a military nature, would appear to serve to conceal the fact that, in the jurisdiction to which Mr. Kindler has been extradited, attempts have been made to find more effective methods of execution, implying that executions have been resumed in the State of Pennsylvania. Consequently, and in application of the principle of in dubio pro reo, it has to be assumed that the execution of the author of the communication is a foreseeable event which, furthermore, will necessarily take place unless exceptional events intervene.m 14. In the second place, the Committee observes, in its majority opinion, that the discretionary right to seek assurances "would normally be exercised where exceptional circumstances existed" and that "careful consideration was given to this possibility".r Nevertheless, here too the Committee has a wrong perception. Canada itself, in its Reply, refers to exceptional circumstances only in two paragraphs and in a very summary manner; it also states, with reference to them, that "there was no evidence presented by Kindler during the extradition process in Canada and there is no evidence in this communication to support the allegations that the use of the death penalty ... violates the Covenant".s This affirmation contains two elements which do not allow me to share the majority opinion: 12. However, in connection with the "exceptional circumstances" mentioned by the State party in the reply of the Government of Canada to the communication from Joseph John Kindler following the Human Rights Committee's decision on admissibility dated 2 April 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the Reply),n the majority opinion in the Committee was that events that would have l (a) Firstly – and this relates to my contention in the previous paragraph – the exceptional circumstances are connected with the application of the death penalty and not with the proceedings at the trial and the sentencing; (b) Secondly, there was no exhaustive examination of what the State considers to be exceptional circumstances, since Kindler submitted no evidence in that connection. According to what we are told by the State party, it was not the responsibility of the Canadian courts, the Minister of Justice or the Human Rights Committee to Views, para. 9.7. m In this connection, I understand by "exceptional events" (it should be noted that "exceptional events" differ somewhat from "exceptional circumstances") those events or acts which would prevent the execution of the author of the communication. They would normally be of a political nature, such as a pardon or the entry into force of legislation abolishing the death penalty. However, since these are decisions of a political nature, taken by persons who depend on the voters' will, and since the death penalty is favoured by a substantial majority of the population of the United States, the possibility that such exceptional events could occur is extremely remote. n o Reply, para. 23 (emphasis added). Views, para. 14.4. q Supreme Court of Canada, United States of America vs. Shepard (1977), 2 S.C.R. 1067, pp. 1083-1087. r Views, para. 14.5. s Reply, para. 23 (emphasis added). In the same connection, the State refers to exceptional circumstances in para. 86 of the same document. p Reply, paras. 22 and 23. 131