afforded by the Covenant. The fact is, rather, that extradition does not fit in with the legal situation defined in article 13. The essential difference lies, in my opinion, in the fact that this rule refers exclusively to the expulsion of "an alien lawfully in the territory of a State party". including 12 murders. It will have to be seen – as the Committee stated in its decision on the admissibility of the communication – whether Canada, in granting Mr. Ng's extradition, exposed him, necessarily and foreseeably, to a violation of the Covenant. 2.2 Extradition is a kind of "expulsion" that goes beyond what is contemplated in the rule. Firstly, extradition is a specific procedure, whereas the rule laid down in article 13 is of a general nature; however, article 13 merely stipulates that expulsion must give rise to a decision in accordance with law, and it is even permissible – in cases where there are compelling reasons of national security – for the alien not to be heard by the competent authority or to have his case reviewed. Secondly, whereas expulsion constitutes a unilateral decision by a State, grounded on reasons that lie exclusively within the competence of that State – provided that they do not violate the State's international obligations, such as those under the Covenant – extradition constitutes an act based upon a request by another State. Thirdly, the rule in article 13 relates exclusively to aliens who are in the territory of a State party to the Covenant, whereas extradition may relate both to aliens and to nationals; indeed, on the basis of its discussions, the Committee has considered the practice of expelling nationals (for example, exile) in general (other than under extradition proceedings) to be contrary to article 12.2 Fourthly, the rule in article 13 relates to persons who are lawfully in the territory of a country. In the case of extradition, the individuals against whom the proceedings are initiated are not necessarily lawfully within the jurisdiction of a country; on the contrary – and especially if it is borne in mind that article 13 leaves the question of the lawfulness of the alien's presence to national law – in a great many instances, persons who are subject to extradition proceedings have entered the territory of the requested State illegally, as in the case of the author of the communication. 3. Although extradition cannot be considered to be a kind of expulsion within the meaning of article 13 of the Covenant, this does not imply that it is excluded from the scope of the Covenant. Extradition must be strictly adapted in all cases to the rules laid down in the Covenant. Thus the extradition proceedings must follow the rules of due process as required by article 14 and, furthermore, their consequences must not entail a violation of any other provision. Therefore, a State cannot allege that extradition is not covered by the Covenant in order to evade the responsibility that would devolve upon it for the possible absence of protection of the possible victim in a foreign jurisdiction. 5. The same State party argued that "the author cannot be considered a victim within the meaning of the Optional Protocol, since his allegations are derived from assumptions about possible future events, which may not materialize and which are dependent on the law and actions of the authorities of the United States" (Views, para. 4.2). Although it is impossible to predict a future event, it must be understood that whether or not a person is a victim depends on whether that event is foreseeable – or, in other words, on whether, according to common sense, it may happen, in the absence of exceptional events that prevent it from occurring – or necessary – in other words, it will inevitably occur, unless exceptional events prevent it from happening. The Committee itself, in concluding that Canada had violated article 7 (Views, para. 17), found that the author of the communication would necessarily and foreseeably be executed. For that reason, I shall not discuss the issue of foreseeability and necessity except to say that I agree with the Views of the majority. 6. Now, with regard to the exceptional circumstances mentioned by the State party (Views, para. 4.4), the most important aspect is that, according to the assertions of the State party itself, they refer to the application of the death penalty. In my opinion, the vital point is the link between the application of the death penalty and the protection given to the lives of persons within the jurisdiction of the State of Canada. For those persons, the death penalty constitutes, in itself, a special circumstance. For that reason – and in so far as the death penalty can be considered as being necessarily and foreseeably applicable – Canada had a duty to seek assurances that Charles Chitat Ng would not be executed. 7. The problem that arises with the extradition of the author of the communication to the United States without any assurances having been requested is that he was deprived of the enjoyment of his rights under the Covenant. Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, although it does not prohibit the death penalty, cannot be understood as an unrestricted authorization for it. In the first place, it has to be viewed in the light of paragraph 1, which declares that every human being has the inherent right to life. It is an unconditional right admitting of no exception. In the second place, it constitutes – for those States which have not abolished the death penalty – a limitation on its application, in so far as it may be imposed only for the most serious crimes. For those States which have abolished the death penalty it represents an insurmountable barrier. The spirit of this article is to eliminate the death penalty as a punishment, and the limitations which it imposes are of an absolute nature. The extradition of the author to the United States of America 4. In this particular case, Canada extradited the author of the communication to the United States of America, where he was to stand trial on 19 criminal counts, 8. In this connection, when Mr. Ng entered Canadian territory he already enjoyed an unrestricted right to life. By extraditing him without having requested assurances that he would not be executed, Canada denied him the protection which he enjoyed and exposed him necessarily and foreseeably to being executed in the opinion of the majority of the Committee, which I share in this regard. Canada has therefore violated article 6 of the Covenant. 2 In this connection, see the summary records of the Committee's recent discussions regarding Zaire and Burundi, in relation to the expulsion of nationals, and Venezuela in relation to the continuing existence, in criminal law, of exile as a penalty. 111