asserts that there are no laws which are incompatible with human rights principles; if there were, there would, under domestic laws, be several remedies against such laws. In this context, the State party refers to articles 20 and 27 of the Constitution of Cameroon, which lay down the principle that draft legislation incompatible with fundamental human rights principles would be repudiated by Parliament or by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, article 9 of Law 72/6 of 26 August 1972 governing the organization and functions of the Supreme Court stipulates that the Supreme Court is competent to adjudicate all disputes of a public law character brought against the State. The State party refers to a judgement handed down by the Supreme Court against the Government in April 1991 which concerned violations of the rights of the defence; this judgement confirms, in the State party's opinion, that remedies against legislative texts deemed incompatible with internationally accepted human rights standards are available and effective. Ordinance 72/5 of 26 August 1972, as modified by Law No. 74/4 of 16 July 1974. This provision stipulates that the military tribunal is seized directly either upon request of the Ministry of Defence, upon request of the examining magistrate (ordonnance de renvoi du juge d'instruction), or by decision of the Court of Appeal. The State party argues that the modalities of appealing to this jurisdiction of exceptional nature demonstrate that its function is purely repressive. This does not rule out, however, the possibility for an individual to appear before the tribunal as an intervenor ("n'exclut point la constitution de partie civile") (art. 17 of Ordinance 72/5). In any event, it remains possible to file civil actions for damages before the ordinary tribunals. 6.5 The State party further rejects as incorrect the author's endorsement of the conclusions of a report published by Amnesty International (referred to in paragraph 2.9) and submits that this document reveals total ignorance of the judicial system of Cameroon and in particular of domestic criminal procedure, which allows the victim [of ill-treatment] to have the person responsible for his treatment prosecuted and indicted before the competent courts, even against the advice of the office of the public prosecutor. The State party further refers to several court decisions, which in its opinion demonstrate that, far from being suppressed by the authorities, claims for damages are entertained by the local courts, and that the claimants in or the parties to such proceedings do not have to fear harassment as a result, as claimed by Mr. Mukong. 6.9 As to the allegations under articles 9 and 14, the State party submits that the examining magistrate who referred the author's case to a military tribunal in January 1989 did not exceed his competence and merely examined whether the evidence against the author justified his indictment. Concerning the author's allegation that he was not notified of the reasons for his arrest and that no warrant was served on him, the State party affirms that article 8 (2) of Law 72/5 of 26 August 1972, which governs this issue, was applied correctly. 6.6 The State party argues that the author's arrest(s) in June 1988 and February 1990 cannot be qualified as arbitrary because they were linked to his activities, considered illegal, as an opposition activist. It denies that the author was not given a fair trial, or that his freedom of expression or of opinion have been violated. 6.10 In this context, it affirms that pursuant to the decision of the examining magistrate to refer the case to the military tribunal the author was not served with an arrest warrant but rather was remanded in custody ("l'auteur n'a pas fait l'objet d'un mandat d'arrêt mais plutôt d'un mandat de dépôt"). The decision of 25 January 1989 was duly notified to him. This decision, according to the State party, duly records all the charges against the author and the reasons for his arrest. Therefore, the notification of this decision to the author was compatible with the provisions of article 9 of the Covenant. Concerning the repeated postponements of the hearing of the case until 5 May 1989, the State party contends that they must be attributed to the author's requests for a competent legal representative, charged with his defence. The delays must therefore be attributed to Mr. Mukong. In respect of the second arrest (February 1990), the author was not served with an arrest warrant, but rather with a direct summons at the request of the Minister for Defense. There was therefore no arrest warrant to notify him of ("n'avait pas fait l'objet d'un mandat d'arrêt mais plutôt d'une citation directe à la requête du Ministre chargé de la Défense. Il n'y avait donc pas mandat d'arrêt à lui notifier à cet effet"). 6.7 In this context, the State party argues that the arrest of the author was for activities and forms of expression that are covered by the limitation clause of article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. It contends that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression must take into account the political context and situation prevailing in a country at any point in time. Since the independence and reunification of Cameroon, the country's history has been a constant battle to strengthen national unity, first at the level of the francophone and anglophone communities and thereafter at the level of the more than 200 ethnic groups and tribes that comprise the Cameroonian nation. 6.8 The State party rejects the author's contention (see para. 2.6 above) that there is no way of challenging laws considered incompatible with international human rights conventions. It first 90