CCPR/C/118/D/2569/2015 3.4 The authors further submit that, according to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, States parties are under an obligation to investigate in each case the possibility of a real risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment upon the return of the deported person.10 They also submit that, according to the jurisprudence of the Court, children have specific needs and extreme vulnerability and that reception facilities for children must be adapted to their age, to ensure that those conditions do not create for them a situation of stress and anxiety, with particularly traumatic consequences. 11 3.5 The authors claim that in the current circumstances, having fled from civil war in the Syrian Arab Republic and in the view of the deplorable living conditions of people who are granted refugee status in Bulgaria, there is a real risk that they and their children would be subject to inhuman and degrading treatment, contrary to the best interests of the children, if they are returned to Bulgaria. They argue that, if returned, they will no longer have the possibility to rent an apartment. State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits 4.1 On 4 August 2015, the State party submitted its observations on the admissibility and merits of the communication and requested the Committee to lift the interim measures. The State party considers that the communication should be held inadmissible, as the authors have failed to establish a prima facie case. The authors have failed to provide substantial grounds to demonstrate that they would be at risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment if returned to Bulgaria. The Refugee Appeals Board found that the authors had a residence permit in Bulgaria and would not face any problems with the nationals and authorities of Bulgaria. Additionally if they returned to Bulgaria, they would not risk refoulement to the Syrian Arab Republic. 4.2 The State party also submits that if the Committee holds the authors’ complaint admissible, it should consider it unsubstantiated, as the authors have failed to establish that their deportation to Bulgaria would constitute a violation of article 7 of the Covenant. In that connection, the State party claims that the authors failed to provide any new information on their personal circumstances beyond the information already relied upon in the context of their asylum application, as reflected in the decision of the Refugee Appeals Board of 20 January 2015. The State party submits that throughout the asylum procedure, the authorities of the State party have considered (a) that the authors fall within section 7 (1) of the Aliens Act, because of a well-founded fear of being subjected to specific, individual persecution of a certain severity if returned to their country of origin; and (b) that the authors have been granted refugee status in Bulgaria. The Board refused to grant asylum to the authors under section 7 (3) of the Aliens Act insofar as Bulgaria could serve as the authors’ country of first asylum. If an asylum seeker has obtained or is able to obtain 10 11 In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the European Court considered that it was the responsibility of the Belgian authorities not to assume that the applicant would be treated in conformity with the Convention standards. The Belgian authorities should first have verified how the Greek authorities applied their asylum legislation in practice and had they done this, they would have seen that the risks the applicant faced were real and individual enough to fall within the scope of article 3 of the European Convention, which corresponds to article 7 of the Covenant. The fact that a large number of asylum seekers in Greece find themselves in the same situation as the applicant does not make the risk any less individual where it is sufficiently real and probable. In a recent judgment of 4 November 2014 in Tarakhel v. Switzerland (application No. 29217/12), the European Court stated that “to fall within the scope of Article 3 the ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim”. The Court further emphasizes that children especially are to be considered vulnerable. See, for example, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, para. 119. 5