80
of human rights and the limits to which the use of weapons by law
enforcement officials is subject to, even under a state of emergency.
(e)
Adequate control and verification of the legality of use of force. Upon
learning that members of the security forces have used firearms causing
lethal consequences, the State must immediately initiate a rigorous,
impartial and effective investigation ex officio. This requires not only
hierarchical or institutional independence, but actual independence.
232.
For its part, in its Report on the Merits No. 34/00 in the Carandirú case,
the IACHR analyzed the proportionality of the actions carried out by the State security
forces, taking as its fundamental premise the principle that a riot “must be suppressed
through such strategies and actions as are needed to bring it under control with minimal
harm to the life and physical integrity of the inmates and minimal risk to law enforcement
officials.” 270 In this case, the IACHR also took into consideration the fact that the State
failed to take appropriate measures to prevent outbreaks of violence, and that the security
forces involved in the actions did not attempt to exhaust other less violent options for
dealing with the situation brought about by the inmates.
233.
The Commission reiterates that it is essential that States first take steps
to prevent violence in prisons, so as to reduce to a minimum the need to resort to the use
of force. Accordingly, as already mentioned, measures adopted should include the
following: separate the different categories of persons deprived of liberty; increase the
number of, and train, personnel; effectively prevent the presence of weapons, drugs, and
money; dismantle criminal gangs; maintain appropriate detention conditions; introduce
productive activities for prisoners; establish and enforce internal prison rules; and develop
other nonviolent means of resolving conflicts. All these measures help to preserve internal
271
order in places of deprivation of liberty.
234.
Indeed, when the State fails to adopt appropriate preventive measures
and does not exercise effective control over internal security in prisons, it opens the door
to, for instance, the rearming of the prison population and situations in which it then sees
itself forced to use security forces whose nature and functions bear no relation to the
maintenance of internal security in prisons. For example, in the decision of the provisional
measures adopted on the matter of the Aragua Penitentiary (Tocoron Prison) regarding
Venezuela, the Court noted that, following a three days riot in that prison, on September,
2010, in which 16 inmates died, more than 36 people were wounded, 8 grenades were
detonated and shots were fired, the State mobilized, among other forces, 1,800 members
272
of the National Guard, an army tank, and 6 armored cars.
270
IACHR, Report No. 34/00, Case 11.291, Merits, Carandiru, Brazil, April 13, 2000, para. 62.
271
IACHR, Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the
Americas, (Principle XXIII.1).
272
I/A Court H.R., Provisional Measures in the matter of Centro Penitenciario de Aragua “Cárcel de
Tocorón,” Venezuela, Order of the Inter‐American Court of Human Rights, November 24, 2010, Having seen: 2.d
and 9.e.
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