CCPR/C/132/D/2675/2015 not state that the hammer did not appear to be the murder weapon, as interpreted by the author. Nor did he state that the lethal wounds were caused by a shovel or a hoe, or similar instrument. During the trial, the expert responded to the author’s counsel’s questions by saying that if a hammer had a sharp end, it could be included in the category of chopping tools. Based on the photographs on file, it was impossible to determine whether the hammer in question could be considered a chopping tool. In order to make such a determination, a medical/criminal examination would have to be carried out. The counsel’s request to hear a different expert was denied because all the questions had been clarified by the first expert and because the courts had duly assessed all available expert opinions. 4.8 Regarding the counsel’s argument about the failure of a witness to appear in court and the absence of measures to summon her, the State party submits that that witness had been summoned by the investigator. The witness had stated that her neighbour had once told her that she wanted to re-register the apartment in her name and in the name of her husband because their son, whom they had adopted in 1993, had become hostile and had had conflicts with them lately. Since the witness had not been present at the crime scene, she was not considered by the investigator as a witness for the prosecution and the court did not consider it necessary to summon her to testify during the trial. The court, however, did refer to the witness in its judgment, as she had witnessed conflict between the author and his mother. The court duly assessed the arguments of both the prosecuting and defending parties, and the decision not to summon the witness was deemed justified. 4.9 Regarding the forensic biological and criminological examinations carried out on the basis of material evidence, the State party argues, among other things, that the expert findings regarding the clothes of both the perpetrator and the victim, the hammer and the knife were signed by the investigator and the relevant witnesses, as were the protocols on the crime scene visit. The findings concerning the blood stains found at the crime scene, however, bore no such signatures. In addition, the defence did not raise any doubts during the court trial about the taking of blood samples. The results of the biological examination indicate that the sweat on the handle of the hammer could have come from a person with blood “type B (III)” or “type O (I)”, including the author. During the court trial, the biology expert stated that it was possible to use DNA to link human sweat to a person, but that doing so would require genetic testing. No request for such testing was received from those involved in the court trial, however, and no related question arose in court. The totality of the evidence collected in the case, as investigated by the court, confirmed the guilt of the author. The court did not have doubts about the admissibility or the sufficiency of the evidence presented. 4.10 According to one of the witnesses, the author was walking along the canal heading towards the city on 1 May 2013, at around 12.30 p.m. The witness, who drove by, offered to take the author. The author accepted, sat in the back seat, and was dropped off near the store Akku. The author’s counsel did not contest the witness statement during the trial. The court justifiably rejected the counsel’s motions contesting the account given by the author’s girlfriend, as the witness’ account was confirmed by police footage of his car. During the cross-examination, the other witness that day confirmed that the author had been taken by car to the vicinity of the store Akku. 4.11 Furthermore, the State party argues that the author’s telephone calls from the crime scene area were detected, that the witness statements supported and confirmed the facts set out in the author’s criminal conviction, that the author’s procedural rights, including the right to be represented by counsel, were respected from the moment of his apprehension and that the medical examination undertaken to assess the claims of beating during the interrogation did not confirm any injury of the author. 4.12 The State party asserts that, in the determination of the criminal charges against the author, his rights to equal treatment before the courts and to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law were respected, as required by the Constitution of Kazakhstan (arts. 13 (2) and 14 (2)) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (art. 21 (2)). The State party also observed its obligations under article 14 (2) and (5) of the Covenant as regards the presumption of innocence (art. 77 (3) of the Constitution) and the review of the author’s conviction and sentence by a higher tribunal, in accordance with the law. 4