CCPR/C/132/D/2675/2015 article 414 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the cassation proceedings before the Supreme Court could not be initiated because the requirements had not been met and that he has already applied to the Prosecutor-General to submit a request for review of the final court decision by the Supreme Court, but that his application was rejected. The Committee observes that, according to the author, the remedies proposed by the State party were not available and effective and that the State party did not rebut this argument. In this context, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence according to which a petition to a prosecutor’s office, which is dependent on the discretionary power of the prosecutor, requesting a review of court decisions that have taken effect does not constitute a remedy that has to be exhausted for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.6 The Committee considers that the State party has not demonstrated that there were additional effective remedies available to the author in the present case. Accordingly, the Committee finds that it is not precluded from examining the communication by the requirements of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. 8.4 The Committee notes the author’s claims that, during his criminal investigation and the court trials, his rights under articles 2, 7 and 14 of the Covenant were violated. The Committee also notes, however, the State party’s argument that the author’s claims are manifestly ill-founded. 8.5 As concerns the author’s claims under article 2, the State party argues that the author enjoyed equality before the courts and all procedural safeguards during the determination of the criminal charges against him. Recalling its jurisprudence according to which the provisions of article 2 of the Covenant lay down general obligations for States parties and cannot, by themselves, give rise to a separate claim under the Optional Protocol as they can be invoked only in conjunction with other substantive articles of the Covenant, 7 the Committee considers the author’s claims under article 2 to be inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 8.6 Regarding the author’s claims under article 7, that he was beaten into confessing to the murder of his mother, the Committee notes the author’s argument that there were no traces of the beating on his body because he was beaten with a plastic bottle filled with water. In this regard, the Committee recalls the State party’s submission that the medical report of 6 May 2013 – following an examination of the author for signs of the sequelae of torture – did not establish any injuries to the author’s body. Based on the material on file, the Committee considers that the author has not adduced sufficient evidence to support his allegations. Accordingly, this part of the communication is declared inadmissible for lack of substantiation, pursuant to article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 8.7 As regards the author’s claims under article 14 (1)–(2) and (3) (b), (d)–(e) and (g) of the Covenant, and article 14 (3) (g) in particular, the Committee notes the author’s argument that the courts treated him as a person who had breached the law and disregarded the facts that he could not enjoy his right to be represented by counsel and that his confession had been extracted by force. The author also asserted that he did not enjoy equality before the courts, that he was subjected to an unfair trial, as he was perceived as a perpetrator, without due regard to evidence in his favour, and that the witness testimonies and expert opinions were interpreted against his interests. The Committee notes the State party’s objections that, during both the pretrial and court proceedings, the author was informed about his right to be represented by counsel, that he had had access to counsel since 2 May 2013 and that his counsel had already assisted the author while he was in pretrial detention, both before and after signing the written confession, as attested by the fact that his counsel participated in all aspects of the investigation that required the author’s presence. Furthermore, the Committee 6 7 8 See Alekseev v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/109/D/1873/2009), para. 8.4; Lozenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/112/D/1929/2010), para. 6.3; Sudalenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/115/D/2016/2010), para. 7.3; Poplavny and Sudalenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/118/D/2139/2012), para. 7.3; and Zhagiparov v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/124/D/2441/2014), para. 12.3. See, e.g., H.E.A.K. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/114/D/2343/2014), para. 7.4; Castañeda v. Mexico (CCPR/C/108/D/2202/2012), para. 6.8; Ch.H.O. v. Canada (CCPR/C/118/D/2195/2012), para. 9.4; Peirano Basso v. Uruguay (CCPR/C/100/D/1887/2009), para. 9.4; A.P. v. Ukraine (CCPR/C/105/D/1834/2008), para. 8.5; and Toussaint v. Canada (CCPR/C/123/D/2348/2014), para. 10.12.