CAT/C/56/D/536/2013 have been assembled so as to justify detention. Article 6 of the Convention, particularly when read in conjunction with article 7 (2), cannot reasonably be interpreted to require taking a person into custody under such circumstances. 4.18 The State party refers to the opinion of Nowak and McArthur 33 and maintains that under article 7 the Convention only obligates States parties to pursue prosecutions of cases that are fit for prosecution. If the prosecuting authorities are of the view that the evidence is insufficient to obtain a conviction, the State party does not violate its obligation under article 7 (1) to submit the case to its competent authorities by not prosecuting an alleged perpetrator. International law cannot and does not obligate police services to conduct an unwarranted investigation when such police services, acting independently and in exercise of their police investigative discretion, determine that an investigation is unwarranted. The State party submits that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had concluded that they neither possessed key evidentiary elements nor were likely to obtain them, so they did not launch an investigation, and it maintains that the above was an entirely reasonable conclusion. Complainants’ comments on the State party’s observations 5.1 In comments dated 30 December 2013, the complainants challenged the State party’s assertion that article 5 (2) of the Convention only provides the obligation to “establish” universal jurisdiction over the offence of torture when the perpetrator is present in its territory and that Canada had done so by enacting section 7 (3.7) of the Criminal Code. They maintain that the obligation in article 5 (2) to take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction requires not simply the enactment of domestic law to permit universal jurisdiction, but also the exercise of su ch jurisdiction where appropriate. They clarify that they are in agreement with the State party that the question of extradition does not arise on the facts and note that, according to the Committee’s findings in Guengueng et al., an extradition request is not required to trigger a State’s obligations under article 5 (2) 5.2 The complainants challenge the State party’s submission that article 22 (1) of the Convention precludes the Committee’s consideration of the communication because the complainants are not and have never been subject to the State party’s jurisdiction. They maintain that the State party relies inappropriately on Rosenmann v. Spain, 34 and confuses the concept of jurisdiction with the concept of standing. The complainants are victims of torture, each of whom moved to initiate criminal proceedings in the State party when the individual that they allege bears individual criminal responsibility for torture was present in the State party. The complainants are individually and directly affected by the State party’s violations of articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Convention arising out of its failures to exercise jurisdiction when an alleged torturer was present in its territory; initiate a preliminary inquiry against him, stemming from the information provided by the complainants and available to it; ensure his presence; and submit the case to the competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. By ratifying and implementing the Convention, including enacting legislation to exercise its jurisdiction over alleged torturers present in its territory and lodging a declaration under article 22, the State party accepted jurisdiction over all victims of alleged torturers present in the State party. 35 5.3 The complainants also challenge the State party’s argument that jurisdiction ought to be defined according to the domestic law of the State against which the 33 34 35 12 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 361. See also the decision of the International Court of Justice in Belgium v. Senegal, paras. 89 et seq. See note 29 above. The complainants refer to Guengueng et al. v. Senegal, paras. 6.3 and 6.4.