It also follows from the requirement in Article 2 § 1 that the deprivation of life be pursuant to the “execution of a sentence of a court”, that the “court” which imposes the penalty be an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of the Court's case-law … and that the most rigorous standards of fairness are observed in the criminal proceedings both at first instance and on appeal. Since the execution of the death penalty is irreversible, it can only be through the application of such standards that an arbitrary and unlawful taking of life can be avoided…. Lastly, the requirement in Article 2 § 1 that the penalty be “provided by law” means not only that there must exist a basis for the penalty in domestic law but that the requirement of the quality of the law be fully respected, namely that the legal basis be “accessible” and “foreseeable” as those terms are understood in the case-law of the Court …. […] In the Court's view, to impose a death sentence on a person after an unfair trial is to subject that person wrongfully to the fear that he will be executed. The fear and uncertainty as to the future generated by a sentence of death, in circumstances where there exists a real possibility that the sentence will be enforced, must give rise to a significant degree of human anguish. Such anguish cannot be dissociated from the unfairness of the proceedings underlying the sentence which, given that human life is at stake, becomes unlawful under the Convention. Having regard to the rejection by the Contracting Parties of capital punishment, which is no longer seen as having any legitimate place in a democratic society, the imposition of a capital sentence in such circumstances must be considered, in itself, to amount to a form of inhuman treatment. --Ocalan v. Turkey, ECHR, 12 March 2003 (paras. 202-203, 207). Inter-American System [I]n situations where a state’s population is threatened by violence, the state has the right and obligation to protect the population against such threats … and in so doing may use lethal force in certain situations. This includes, for example, the use of lethal force by law enforcement officials where strictly unavoidable to protect themselves or other persons from imminent threat of death or serious injury … or to otherwise maintain law and order where strictly necessary and proportionate. The Court has explained that, in such circumstances, states have the right to use force, “even if this implies depriving people of their lives…. There is an abundance of reflections in philosophy and history as to how the death of individuals in these circumstances generates no responsibility whatsoever against the State or its officials.” […] The means that can be used by the state while protecting its security or that of its citizens are not unlimited, however. To the contrary, as specified by the Court, “regardless of the seriousness of certain actions and the culpability of 30