CAT/C/68/D/782/2016 or to act on complaints.”29 Nevertheless, the assessment of the risk of being subjected to torture cannot be based exclusively on the general situation in Egypt; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the alleged victim would be personally exposed to danger. 10.7 In the present case, the Committee notes that the complainant claimed to have been a member and co-founder of an independent, and therefore unrecognized, union of Egyptian journalists since 2005, having published articles about corruption in Egypt that implicate senior officials. The Committee notes that, according to the complainant, the proof that he is subject to political persecution lies in the fact that he was sentenced to life imprisonment on 28 August 2013 following his involvement in a case of forgery of authentic instruments (“forgery and use of forged documents”) in collusion with a public official, after which his newspapers were confiscated, while he was not detained, as well as the fact that he remained subject to police surveillance and therefore feared that he could be arrested and tortured at any moment. The Committee also notes the complainant’s claim that a life sentence for committing a minor offence, even if it had been committed by the complainant, is totally disproportionate and that the situation of journalists in Egypt has worsened since the extradition request was submitted by the Egyptian authorities. Furthermore, the Committee notes that, on 29 February 2016, the complainant had already been sentenced by the Casablanca criminal court of first instance to 3 months’ imprisonment for forgery of private business documents, unauthorized and unlawful practice of a regulated profession, and affixing of stamps and seals that could be mistaken for the seals of a foreign State, in respect of which the complainant recalls the ne bis in idem principle. 10.8 The Committee notes that, in authorizing the complainant’s extradition, the Court of Cassation made no assessment of the risk of torture that extradition would entail for him as an independent journalist, in view of the situation in Egypt. However, no explanation was given as to how the State party had assessed the risk of torture faced by the complainant, in order to make sure he would not be at risk of treatment in violation of article 3 of the Convention upon his return to Egypt. The Committee recalls that the primary aim of the Convention is to prevent torture.30 10.9 In the light of the foregoing, the Committee considers that the State party had a duty to undertake an individualized assessment of the personal and real risk that the complainant would face in Egypt, particularly given that the complainant had been sentenced to life imprisonment for a minor offence. The Committee also considers that article 721 of the Moroccan Code of Criminal Procedure does not specifically mention the risk of torture and ill-treatment in the event of extradition, but only the risk of a deterioration in the personal situation of individuals who are the subject of extradition requests on the grounds of their race, religion, nationality or political opinions, if the offence in respect of which extradition is requested is considered by the State party to be a political offence or to be connected with such an offence. The Committee concludes that, in the present case, the assessments by the Court of Cassation do not rebut the argument that there is a foreseeable, present, personal and real risk that the complainant will be subjected to torture if extradited to Egypt, in violation of article 3 of the Convention. 10.10 With regard to the complainant’s assertion that the conditions in which he is being held have caused him physical harm, in violation of article 16, the Committee notes the absence of any clarification by the State party intended to refute the complainant’s claims that, since his transfer to Tiflet 2 prison, he has been held in the high-security wing, in solitary confinement, without medical assistance, which is likely to have negatively affected his health, and without any contact with his family and his lawyer. In this regard, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence concerning certain basic guarantees that must be applied to all persons deprived of their liberty, in order to prevent them from being subjected to torture or ill-treatment. Among those guarantees is the right for detainees to benefit promptly from independent medical and legal assistance and to contact their family. In the circumstances of the present case, the Committee considers that the complainant’s detention in solitary confinement, his limited contact with his family and his lawyer and his irregular access to health care constitute a violation of article 16 of the Convention. The Committee therefore considers that the conditions in which the complainant is being held disclose a violation by the State party of its obligations under article 16 of the Convention. 29 30 GE.19-22535 Ibid., para. 69. Alan v. Switzerland (CAT/C/16/D/21/1995), para. 11.5. 11